• 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文期刊>Land Use Policy >Evolutionary Game Analysis of Fallow Farmland Behaviors of Different Types of Farmers and Local Governments
【24h】

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Fallow Farmland Behaviors of Different Types of Farmers and Local Governments

机译：不同类型农民和地方政府的休耕农田行为的进化博弈分析

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

The fallowing of farmland is a basic system in China that allows the degraded farmland to recuperate and restore the ecological environment. However, during the implementation of the fallow policy, the fallow farmers may not be subsidized, the farmers may be subsidized but they are not fallowing, or the area of fallow may not have reached the expected target. To solve these problems, under the conditions of bounded rationality and information asymmetry, this paper constructs evolutionary game models of different types of farmers and local governments, studies evolutionarily stable equilibrium strategies, and conducts simulation analysis. The results showed that (1) pure farmers and local governments cannot achieve ideal equilibrium through independent games, and the central government needs to supervise both sides. The fines need to be greater than the pure income of the farmers' crops and subsidies of local governments. (2) Only when part-time farmers use all their time to engage in other industries and earn more than the income from other industries while planting crops, the independent game can achieve an ideal balance. Otherwise, it is necessary to introduce the central government to supervise both parties. The fines need to be greater than the difference between the income of part-time farmers with or without fallows and the subsidies of the local government. (3) In the absence of external constraints, any nonfarmers' strategy is evolutionary and stable. The local governments' evolutionarily stable equilibrium strategy are nonsubsidized. To ensure that nonfarmers choose the fallow policy, the central government needs to supervise the fallow subsidies of local governments, and the fines need to be greater than the subsidies of local governments. (4) Some relevant policy implications are put forward. Including implementing differentiated fallow farmland supervision and punishment strategies, improving the performance appraisal system and accelerating the construction of township enterprises.
机译：农田的堕落是中国的基本系统，使得退化的农田能够恢复和恢复生态环境。但是，在实施休耕政策期间，休耕农民可能无法补贴，农民可能会补贴，但他们没有跌倒，或者休耕地区可能没有达到预期目标。为了解决这些问题，在有界合理性和信息不对称的条件下，本文构建了不同类型农民和地方政府的进化博弈模型，研究进化地稳定的均衡策略，并进行了模拟分析。结果表明，（1）纯农民和地方政府无法通过独立游戏实现理想的均衡，中央政府需要监督双方。罚款需要大于农民作物的纯净收入和地方政府的补贴。 （2）只有兼职农民使用所有时间从事其他行业并在种植作物时从其他行业的收入赚取超过其他行业的收入时，独立游戏就可以实现理想的平衡。否则，有必要介绍中央政府监督双方。罚款需要大于兼职农民收入之间的差异，有或没有休息和地方政府的补贴。 （3）在没有外部制约因素的情况下，任何非植物的战略都是进化和稳定的。地方政府的进化稳定的均衡策略是非管制的。为确保非渣选择休耕政策，中央政府需要监督地方政府的休耕补助，并且罚款需要大于地方政府的补贴。 （4）提出了一些相关的政策影响。包括实施差异化的休耕耕地监督和惩罚战略，改善绩效考核制度，加快乡镇建设。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号