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首页> 外文期刊>Agricultural and Resource Economics Review >Keep It Down: An Experimental Test of the Truncated k-Double Auction.
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Keep It Down: An Experimental Test of the Truncated k-Double Auction.

机译：保持低调：截断式k-Double拍卖的实验测试。

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摘要

The introduction of a centralized institution for trading production rights in quota-regulated agricultural sectors can dramatically improve the flow of information among market participants and increase efficiency. On the other hand, prevailing conditions in these small markets can provide sellers with a market advantage, yielding high quota prices that impose important financial costs on quota holders and limit the entry of new producers into the industry. In this paper, we modify the normal allocation rule of the k-double auction (kDA) to counter thin market conditions and to favor buyers who bid low prices. In laboratory experiments, we test the "truncated" kDA (T-kDA) against a regular kDA for its ability to affect buyer and seller behavior and decrease equilibrium prices, and assess how it impacts efficiency. The results show that the T-kDA significantly lowers the equilibrium price and results in moderate efficiency losses. Most importantly, the T-kDA effectively counters the market power of oligopolists when demand far outstrips supply.
机译：在配额管制下的农业部门中建立一个用于生产权交易的中央机构，可以大大改善市场参与者之间的信息流动并提高效率。另一方面，这些小市场中的普遍状况可以为卖方提供市场优势，产生高额配额价格，这给配额持有人带来了重要的财务成本，并限制了新生产者进入该行业。在本文中，我们修改了k-double拍卖（kDA）的正常分配规则，以应对市场疲软的情况，并青睐竞标低价的买家。在实验室实验中，我们针对常规kDA测试“截断的” kDA（T-kDA）的能力，该能力会影响买卖双方的行为并降低均衡价格，并评估其如何影响效率。结果表明，T-kDA显着降低了均衡价格，并导致了适度的效率损失。最重要的是，当需求远远超过供应时，T-kDA有效地抵消了寡头市场的力量。

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