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Just do it? When to do what you judge you ought to do

机译:去做就对了? 什么时候做你判断你应该做的事情

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摘要

While it is generally believed that justification is a fallible guide to the truth, there might be interesting exceptions to this general rule. In recent work on bridge-principles, an increasing number of authors have argued that truths about what a subject ought to do are truths we stand in some privileged epistemic relation to and that our justified normative beliefs are beliefs that will not lead us astray. If these bridge-principles hold, it suggests that justification might play an interesting role in our normative theories. In turn, this might help us understand the value of justification, a value that’s notoriously difficult to understand if we think of justification as but a fallible means to a desired end. We will argue that these bridge-principles will be incredibly difficult to defend. While we do not think that normative facts necessarily stand in any interesting relationship to our justified beliefs about them, there might well be a way of defending the idea that our justified beliefs about what to do won’t lead us astray. In turn, this might help us understand the value of justification, but this way of thinking about justification and its value comes with costs few would be willing to pay.
机译:虽然人们普遍认为,对真理的理由是一个糟糕的指导,这可能对这一一般规则可能有趣的例外。在最近的桥梁原则上的工作中,越来越多的作者认为,关于一个受试者应该做的事实是我们在一些特权的认识关系中得到的真理,而我们的合理的规范信念是不会导致美国误入歧途的信念。如果这些桥梁原则持有,它表明理由可能在我们的规范理论中发挥有趣的作用。反过来,这可能有助于我们了解理由的价值,这是一个难以理解的价值,难以理解,如果我们想到理由,而是难以易懂的意思。我们会争辩说,这些桥梁原则将非常难以捍卫。虽然我们不认为规范性事实必然存在于我们对他们的有道理信仰的任何有趣关系,但可能会使我们捍卫我们对所做什么的理由,不会导致我们的误区。反过来,这可能有助于我们了解理由的价值,但这种思考理由的方式及其价值仍然愿意支付费用。

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