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Structural Estimation of a Becker-Ehrlich Equilibrium Model of Crime: Allocating Police Across Cities to Reduce Crime

机译:Becker-Ehrlich Quealibium模型的结构估计:跨城市分配警察减少犯罪

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摘要

We develop a model of crime in which the number of police, the crime rate, the arrest rate, the employment rate, and the wage rate are joint outcomes of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. The local government chooses the size of its police force and citizens choose among work, home, and crime alternatives. We estimate the model using metropolitan statistical area (MSA)-level data. We use the estimated model to examine the effects on crime of targeted federal transfers to local governments to increase police. We find that knowledge about unobserved MSA-specific attributes is critical for the optimal allocation of police across MSA's.
机译:我们制定了一个犯罪模式,其中警察人数,犯罪率,逮捕率,就业率和工资率是Subgame完美纳什均衡的联合结果。 当地政府选择其警察部队和公民的规模,在工作,家庭和犯罪替代方案中选择。 我们使用大都市统计区(MSA)--LEVEL数据来估计模型。 我们使用估计的模型来检查目标联邦转移到地方政府增加警察的影响。 我们发现关于未观察到的MSA特定属性的知识对于在MSA的最佳警察的最佳分配至关重要。

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