Government Insurance Program Design, Incentive Effects, and Technology Adoption: The Case of Skip-Row Crop Insurance

Woodard Joshua D.; Pavlista Alexander D.; Schnitkey Gary D.; Burgener Paul A.; Ward Kimberley A.

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Government Insurance Program Design, Incentive Effects, and Technology Adoption: The Case of Skip-Row Crop Insurance

机译：政府保险计划设计，激励效果和技术采用：跳过作物保险的案例

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Can the availability of poorly-designed government insurance alter technology adoption decisions A theoretical model of technology adoption and insurance incentive effects for a high- and low-risk technology is developed and explored empirically using a unique dataset of skip-row agronomic trial data. A multivariate nonparametric resampling technique is developed, which augments the trial data with a larger dataset of conventional yields to improve estimation efficiency. Skip-row adoption is found to increase mean yields and reduce risk in areas prone to drought. RMA insurance rules have incentive-distorting impacts which disincentivize skip-row adoption.

机译：设计不当的政府保险是否可以改变技术采用决策？使用独特的跳过行农学试验数据集，可以凭经验开发和探索高风险技术和低风险技术的技术采用和保险激励效应的理论模型。开发了一种多变量非参数重采样技术，该技术以较大的常规产量数据集扩充了试验数据，从而提高了估算效率。在易受干旱地区，采用免行提高了平均产量并降低了风险。 RMA保险规则具有扭曲激励的影响，从而阻碍了跳过行的采用。

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来源
《American Journal of Agricultural Economics》 |2012年第4期|共15页
作者
Woodard Joshua D.; Pavlista Alexander D.; Schnitkey Gary D.; Burgener Paul A.; Ward Kimberley A.;
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中图分类农业经济;
关键词
Adverse selection; federal Crop Insurance; insurance design; insurance pricing; nonparametric methods; risk management; skip-row corn; technology adoption; yield risk;

机译：逆向选择;联邦作物保险;保险设计;保险定价;非参数方法;风险管理;免耕玉米;技术采用;收益风险;

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1. Government Insurance Program Design, Incentive Effects, and Technology Adoption: The Case of Skip-Row Crop Insurance [J] . Woodard Joshua D., Pavlista Alexander D., Schnitkey Gary D., American Journal of Agricultural Economics . 2012,第4期

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2. An ex post evaluation of the conservation reserve, federal crop insurance, and other government programs: program participation and soil erosion [J] . Barry K. Goodwin, Vincent H. Smith Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics . 2003,第2期

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3. The role of intermediaries in delivering an occupational health and safety programme designed for small businesses - A case study of an insurance incentive programme in the agriculture sector [J] . Olsen Kirsten Bendix, Hasle Peter Safety science . 2015,第Pta3期

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Government Insurance Program Design, Incentive Effects, and Technology Adoption: The Case of Skip-Row Crop Insurance

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