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首页> 外文期刊>International Journal of Services and Operations Management >Impact of information on newsvendor ordering and incentive contact for retailer in a two-level supply chain
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Impact of information on newsvendor ordering and incentive contact for retailer in a two-level supply chain

机译：信息对两级供应链中零售商的新闻供应商订购和激励联系的影响

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摘要

This paper addresses two problems: 1) comparison of newsvendor's ordering policies for high margin fashion products with and without demand knowledge under his risk profile. Generally, a buyer is considered conservative when he has an estimate about demand mean and variance and he orders aggressively when he has demand knowledge. We compare these ordering policies under buyer risk profile for high margin products. For highly perishable and trendsetters lack of information is not detrimental. Newsvendor of such product can forego demand information because fast changing trend may not allow him to gather reliable demand forecast. 2) Our second model encompasses an incentive contract based on two incentive schemes for fashion items that is essentially design-win and specifically supply chain coordinated as well. For highly trendy products, manufacturer reserves more capacity at the time of negotiation or retailer orders less because of risk profile. Manufacturer offers buyer/retailer incentive to order more before demand is actually realised. Manufacturer can find a wholesale price that divides supply chain profits proportionally. For a game theoretic environment, we examine contract numerically and find that contract efficiency depends on wholesale price and demand variability.
机译：本文解决了两个问题：1）比较在风险状况下有和没有需求知识的新闻销售商针对高利润率时尚产品的订购策略。通常，当买方对需求均值和方差有一个估计时，他被认为是保守的;而当他拥有需求知识时，他会积极地定购。我们在买家风险状况下针对高利润产品比较这些订购政策。对于极易腐烂和引领潮流的人来说，缺乏信息是无害的。这种产品的新闻供应商可以放弃需求信息，因为快速变化的趋势可能不允许他收集可靠的需求预测。 2）我们的第二个模型包含一个基于两个针对时尚项目的激励方案的激励合同，该方案本质上是设计双赢的，并且特别是供应链的协调。对于高度流行的产品，由于风险状况，制造商在协商时保留了更多的容量，而零售商的订单则较少。制造商提供买方/零售商激励，以在实际实现需求之前订购更多产品。制造商可以找到批发价格，该价格可以按比例划分供应链利润。对于博弈论环境，我们对合同进行了数字检验，发现合同效率取决于批发价格和需求的可变性。

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