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首页> 外文期刊>Engineering Management Journal. >Modeling Government Subsidies and Project Risk for Financially Non-Viable Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) Projects
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Modeling Government Subsidies and Project Risk for Financially Non-Viable Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) Projects

机译：为财政上不可行的建造-运营-转让（BOT）项目建模政府补贴和项目风险

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摘要

Governments encourage private sector participation in building infrastructure through Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) agreements. Large projects may be financially non-viable despite their net economic benefits for the host society. Host governments might subsidize initial private investments to create financial feasibility. Small-scale subsidies might not sufficiently reduce project risks to attract private investment; however, large percentage subsidies might result in loose profit structures, discouraging the pursuit of efficiency. This article applies Monte Carlo techniques to data from the Taiwanese West Corridor High-Speed Rail Project to assess the subsidy-risk trade-off relationship. The results provide guidance for public-private negotiations.
机译：各国政府鼓励通过建造－运营－转让（BOT）协议鼓励私营部门参与基础设施建设。大型项目尽管对东道国社会具有净经济利益，但在财务上可能不可行。东道国政府可能会补贴最初的私人投资以创造财务可行性。小规模的补贴可能不足以降低项目风险以吸引私人投资。但是，高比例的补贴可能会导致利润结构松散，从而阻碍了对效率的追求。本文将蒙特卡洛技术应用于台湾西部走廊高铁项目的数据，以评估补贴与风险之间的权衡关系。结果为公私谈判提供了指导。

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