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Self-specificity of the external body

机译：外体的自我特异性

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Mark Solms suggests that the internal body, equated with the id and represented at the brainstem structures, gives us the self-as-subject consciousness, while the external body, equated with the ego, is represented as an object, analogous to any other object in the world. Is memory space the sole, or at least the most important, contribution that the ego can make to the id? I would like to argue that it is not. Even though the basis of phenomenal consciousness - the "being-me" state - might be given by the brainstem consciousness, the most important function of the ego is precisely that it can represent my body as an object and identify it with the internal body. Thus, both bodies need to be represented as self-specific, and inevitably this will require the contribution of a cortical network. Both the ego and the id, in Solms's terms, co-constitute self-specificity.
机译：马克·索尔姆斯（Mark Solms）认为，与id等同并在脑干结构中表示的内部物体赋予我们自我主体意识，而与自我等同的外部物体则被表示为物体，类似于任何其他物体在世界上。记忆空间是自我对ID的唯一或至少最重要的贡献吗？我想说不是。即使现象意识的基础-“存在于我”状态-可能是脑干意识所赋予的，但自我的最重要功能恰恰是它可以将我的身体表现为一个物体，并将其与内部物体进行识别。因此，两个身体都需要表现为自我特异性，这不可避免地需要皮层网络的参与。用索尔姆斯的术语来说，自我和内在共同构成了自我特质。

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