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Competition Between Sports Leagues: Theory and Evidence on Rival League Formation in North America

机译:体育联盟之间的竞争:北美竞争联盟形成的理论和证据

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摘要

We analyze the formation of rival leagues and deterrence by incumbent leagues in professional team sports, which is one of the least studied forms of competition in sports. We first survey the economic history of professional sport leagues in North America and develop stylized facts about rival league formation. We then develop a game-theoretical model to explain some of these interesting stylized facts, showing that if the bargaining power of the incumbent league is sufficiently small-i.e., less than a certain cutoff-the incumbent should choose expansion to deter the rival league formation; otherwise, it is optimal for the incumbent league to allow a rival league formation and then merge with it, conditional on rival league success. We further show that the incumbent league may pay players relatively high salaries as an alternative way to deter formation by a rival league.
机译:我们分析了职业团队运动中现有联赛的竞争对手联盟的形成和威慑作用,这是体育运动中研究最少的形式之一。我们首先调查一下北美职业体育联盟的经济历史,并得出有关竞争对手联盟形成的程式化事实。然后,我们建立一个博弈论模型来解释其中一些有趣的程式化事实,表明如果现任联赛的议价能力足够小(即小于某个临界值),则该任职者应选择扩张来阻止竞争对手的组建;否则,对于现任联盟来说,允许竞争对手组成联盟然后与之合并是最佳选择,这要取决于对手联盟的成功。我们进一步证明,现任联赛可能会向球员支付相对较高的薪水,以阻止对手联赛的组建。

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