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首页> 外文期刊>Philosophy, psychiatry, & psychology: PPP >Belief as Delusional and Delusion as Belief
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Belief as Delusional and Delusion as Belief

机译：妄想为信念，妄想为信念

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Richard Mullen and Grant Gillett (2014) decry the oversimplifications that accompany 'doxastic' analyses of delusion analogizing them to belief states; particularly, they object to the recent elevation to the status of paradigmatic the ordinary beliefs often understood, in Bayesian terms, as probabilistic estimates of empirical facts. Such an approach ignores the significance of the delusion for the individual, they emphasize, neglecting the delusional person's conceptions of self and identity in relation to the world. In support of their plea for a broader, more nuanced, and more clinically and existentially sensitive understanding of delusion, Mullen and Gillett enumerate drawbacks to the doxastic view not hitherto noted by its other critics, and explore generalizations about the delusional person's thought as enactment, and the dualities in her frame of mind.
机译：理查德·穆伦（Richard Mullen）和格兰特·吉列（Grant Gillett）（2014）谴责妄想分析的“过分简化”分析，将其简化为信仰状态。特别是，他们反对以贝叶斯的观点将通常被理解为经验事实的概率估计的普通信念最近提升为范式的地位。他们强调，这种方法忽略了妄想对个人的重要性，而忽略了妄想者关于世界的自我和身份观念。为了支持他们对错觉有更广泛，更细微的，更临床上和存在上的敏感性理解，Mullen和Gillett列举了迄今为止其他批评家尚未注意到的盲目观点的弊端，并探索了关于错觉者思想的成见，以及她心态的二重性。

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