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Game Analysis on the Failure of the Internal Supervision Mechanism of State-owned Enterprises

机译：国有企业内部监督机制失败的博弈分析

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摘要

According to the behavior characteristics of managers of state owned enterprises, starting from the perspective of utility maximization and based on principal-agent game analysis, this paper establish a new state-owned enterprise managers corruption and internal supervisor behavior model, for the first time the internal recessive incentive effect variables is introduced in this model. This paper studies on the optimal behavior choice of state-owned enterprises managers and the internal supervisors. The existing system will induce the state-owned enterprise managers to achieve the goal of self utility maximization, and to suppress the effect of internal supervision, and connive with corruption. Finally, this paper discusses measures and suggestions about how to increase internal supervision and improve the supervision of state-owned enterprises themselves to reduce corruption of managers.
机译：根据国有企业管理者的行为特征，从公用事业最大化和基于委托 - 代理游戏分析的角度，建立了一个新的国有企业经理腐败和内部主管行为模式，第一次本模型中引入了内部隐性激励效果变量。本文研究国有企业经理和内部监事的最佳行为选择。现有系统将诱使国有企业管理者实现自营效力最大化的目标，并抑制内部监督的效果，并康复。最后，本文讨论了关于如何提高内部监督和改善国有企业自身监督的措施和建议，以减少经理腐败。

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