首页> 外文会议>Emerging Markets Queries in Finance and Business Conference >The impact of the European neutrality rule on Romanian directors' duties in hostile takeovers-a case study of Romanian companies present on the Bucharest Stock Exchange
【24h】

The impact of the European neutrality rule on Romanian directors' duties in hostile takeovers-a case study of Romanian companies present on the Bucharest Stock Exchange

机译:欧洲中立统治对敌对收购罗马尼亚董事职责的影响 - 以布加勒斯特证券交易所罗马尼亚公司为例

获取原文

摘要

The purpose of this study is to critically analyse the evolution of the Romanian directors' duties under the reign of the neutrality rule instated by the European Directive 2004/25/EC on takeover bids. The issue of the takeover relevant directors' duties has not been specifically and critically addressed in Romania. We reach the conclusion that due to similarities between the American and Romanian directors' fiduciary duties and considering that the Romanian capital market is an area that is heading towards further development, the natural progression of the duties of directors of the companies present on the Bucharest Stock Exchange should follow the organic evolution of their American counterparts. This development is, however, artificially altered by the European neutrality rule. As shown above, the protection of Romanian minority shareholders is deficient under the European rule and the interests of Romanian companies and their shareholders may be affected by the application of the neutrality rule. Furthermore, the European Directive 2004/25/EC creates a disadvantage for European companies compared to their non-European equivalents, primarily in regard to U.S. companies. For these reasons we conclude that it is necessary de lege ferenda to diminish the application of the neutrality rule at least in Romania's case. This initiative should be accompanied by a reconsideration of Romanian directors' duties in hostile takeover through the lens of their American counterparts' position, the next stage in the evolution of the legal and economic field, as mentioned above.
机译:本研究的目的是批判地分析欧洲指令2004/25 / EC在收购投标的中立规则统治下罗马尼亚董事职责的演变。收购相关董事职责的问题尚未在罗马尼亚具体而统治地解决。我们得出结论,由于美国和罗马尼亚董事的信托职责,审议罗马尼亚人资本市场是一个正在走向进一步发展的领域,本公司董事职责的自然进展是在布加勒斯特股票交换应遵循美国同行的有机演变。然而,这种发展是由欧洲中立规则人为地改变。如上所示,保护罗马尼亚少数股东在欧洲统治下缺乏缺乏,罗马尼亚公司及其股东的利益可能受中立规则的应用影响。此外,欧洲指令2004/25 / EC为欧洲公司创造了欧洲企业的缺点,而非欧洲的同等学生主要在美国公司方面。由于这些原因,我们得出结论,必须在罗马尼亚的情况下减少中立规则的应用。如上所述,这项倡议应伴随着罗马尼亚董事履行敌对地区的敌对收购责任的职责,如上所述,在法律和经济领域的演变中的下一阶段。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号