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Thinking ahead: Time horizons and the legalization of international investment agreements.

机译：未来思考：时间跨度和国际投资协议的合法化。

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摘要

This dissertation seeks to explain why international investment agreements, despite being created with the same purposes and functions in mind, often display important variation in their degree of legalization. I posit that such variation exists because legalization creates a trade-off - between making credible commitments to foreign investors and retaining autonomous control over investment policies - that governments choose to resolve differently. Therefore, to explain the legalization of investment agreements, I develop a theory which explains how governments resolve the credibility-autonomy trade-off, leading them to conclude agreements with varying levels of legalization.;My core argument is that governments' willingness to submit to extensive constraints on their policy autonomy is shaped powerfully by their time horizons. Governments with long time horizons prize having greater autonomy to modify policies that shape the effect that foreign investment has on their economies in response to shifts in economic and political conditions that can occur over time. Governments with shorter time horizons, on the other hand, do not anticipate being in power long into the future and therefore are less concerned about maintaining greater policy freedom. Therefore, I hypothesize that when BITs are signed by governments with long time horizons, their level of legalization will be calibrated to promote greater policy autonomy than when they are concluded by governments with short time horizons. In addition, I argue that domestic political and institutional variables such as regime type, party institutionalization, and autocratic regime structure are critical in framing leaders' time horizons, and thus establish a theoretical link between domestic politics and the legalization of international investment institutions.;To evaluate my argument, I use original data on the design features of a random sample of 346 bilateral investment treaties (BITs). Using this data, I construct original measures of the degree of legalization with respect to its three dimensions - obligation, delegation and precision. Using quantitative methods of analysis, I find a robust relationship between the time horizons of governments and the degree of legalization of the BITs they conclude. Specifically, governments with long time horizons are more likely to conclude BITs at a level of legalization that promotes greater policy autonomy. In the case of obligation and precision, this holds with respect to net importers of dyadic FDI, and in the case of delegation, I find that the time horizons of net exporters display a statistically stronger relationship with legalization. These results hold across regime types and are robust to controlling for selection into BITs and a range of control variables.
机译：本论文试图解释为什么国际投资协议尽管具有相同的目的和功能，但在合法化程度上却经常表现出重要的差异。我认为存在这种差异是因为合法化会在政府选择以不同方式解决方案之间做出权衡（在对外国投资者作出可靠承诺与保持对投资政策的自主控制之间）。因此，为了解释投资协议的合法性，我开发了一种理论，该理论解释了政府如何解决信誉与自主权衡问题，从而促使他们以不同程度的合法化达成协议。；我的核心观点是政府愿意接受他们的政策范围受到其时间范围的强烈影响。具有长远眼光的政府认为，随着经济和政治条件的变化，随着时间的推移，将有更大的自治权来修改影响外国投资对其经济的影响的政策。另一方面，时间间隔较短的政府并不期望在未来很长时间内掌权，因此不太关心保持更大的政策自由。因此，我假设，当双边投资条约由具有长期前景的政府签署时，其合法化水平将得到校准，以促进比短期政府签署的双边贸易协定具有更大的政策自主性。此外，我认为，政体类型，政党制度化和专制政体结构等国内政治和制度变量对于确定领导人的时间范围至关重要，因此在国内政治与国际投资机构合法化之间建立了理论联系。为了评估我的论点，我使用了有关346个双边投​​资条约（BIT）的随机样本的设计特征的原始数据。利用这些数据，我就其合法性程度的三个维度（义务，授权和准确性）构建了原始度量。使用定量分析方法，我发现政府的时间跨度与它们得出的BIT合法化程度之间存在稳固的关系。具体而言，具有长远前景的政府更有可能以合法化水平缔结双边投资条约，以促进更大的政策自主性。就义务和准确性而言，这适用于二元外国直接投资的净进口国，而对于授权而言，我发现净出口国的时间跨度与合法化之间显示出统计上更强的关系。这些结果适用于不同类型的机制，并且对于选择BIT和一系列控制变量的控制具有鲁棒性。

著录项

  • 作者

    Blake, Daniel J.;

  • 作者单位

    The Ohio State University.;

  • 授予单位 The Ohio State University.;
  • 学科 Economics Finance.;Political Science International Relations.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2010
  • 页码 282 p.
  • 总页数 282
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

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