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Justifying self-defense, defense of others, and the use of force in law enforcement.

机译：为自卫，辩护他人和在执法中使用武力辩护。

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摘要

While the permissibility of self-defense may seem obvious, philosophers and legal theorists have had difficulty creating a complete and sound philosophical justification. The right of self-defense has odd contours: in some dimensions, the right is broad, while in others, very narrow. Current theories have difficulty justifying both aspects. Rights-based theories, specifically, can justify the broad permission to use force, but they have trouble explaining the extensive restrictions on exercising the right. Making matters even more complicated, the breadth of one's self-defense right can vary. Law enforcement officers acting in their official capacity, unlike private citizens, never have a duty to retreat before using deadly force. Philosophers generally have ignored such complications.;In this dissertation, I demonstrate how a rights-based account can explain the broad and narrow nature of the right of self-defense. Utilizing concepts from both moral and political theory, I justify the traditional limitations on the right of self-defense, including the necessity and imminence requirements. I argue that unnecessary force interferes with aggressors' right to due process of law and usurps the authority of the state to adjudicate rights-claims and other disputes. Drawing from Kant, I also argue that individuals lack authority to vindicate their rights. The right of self-defense is a supplementary mechanism by which defenders preserve their right to seek justice in a court of law.;I argue that the positive permission to use force derives from three interests: (1) protection of individual autonomy, autonomy-based rights, and respect for persons; (2) preservation of the ability to seek a full (or almost full) judicial remedy to vindicate a violation of one's rights; and (3) protection of the public peace and security. I argue that unjust aggression, unlike other violations of rights, may be resisted with violence because of the extensive harm to one's person that can result and the inability to seek judicial redress. I also define and justify the proportionality requirement and demonstrate how that requirement is consistent with a theory justifying self-defense based on protecting autonomy and autonomy-based rights. Finally, I apply my theory to non-core cases, including the expanded rights of law enforcement officers.
机译：尽管自卫的许可似乎很明显，但哲学家和法律理论家却难以建立完整而合理的哲学论证。自卫权的轮廓很奇怪：在某些方面，权利是宽泛的，而在另一些方面，则是非常狭窄的。当前的理论很难证明这两个方面。具体而言，基于权利的理论可以证明广泛使用武力是合理的，但是它们难以解释行使权利的广泛限制。使事情更加复杂的是，一个人的自卫权的广度可能会有所不同。与私人公民不同，以公务身份行事的执法人员在使用致命武力之前从来没有义务撤退。哲学家们通常忽略了这种复杂性。在本文中，我演示了基于权利的解释如何解释自卫权的广泛性和狭义性。利用道德和政治理论的概念，我证明了自卫权的传统限制，包括必要性和迫切性要求。我认为，不必要的武力会干扰侵略者享有正当法律程序的权利，并侵害国家对权利要求和其他争端进行裁决的权力。我还从康德（Kant）那里汲取经验，认为个人缺乏维护自己权利的权威。自卫权是一种补充机制，通过这种机制，维权者可以保留其在法院寻求正义的权利。我认为，使用武力的积极许可源于三个利益：（1）保护个人自主权，即：基本权利和对人的尊重； （2）保留寻求充分（或几乎全部）司法补救来维护侵犯人权的能力； （三）保护公众的和平与安全。我认为，与其他侵犯人权的行为不同，不公正的侵略可以用暴力来抵制，因为这可能对人身造成广泛伤害，并且无法寻求司法补救。我还将定义和证明比例性要求，并说明该要求如何与基于保护自治和基于自治的权利的自卫性理论相一致。最后，我将我的理论应用于非核​​心案件，包括扩大执法人员的权利。

著录项

  • 作者

    Leider, Robert.;

  • 作者单位

    Georgetown University.;

  • 授予单位 Georgetown University.;
  • 学科 Philosophy.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2009
  • 页码 263 p.
  • 总页数 263
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 哲学理论;
  • 关键词

  • 入库时间 2022-08-17 11:37:46

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