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The role of third party incentives in hurting stalemate: A critique of ripeness theory.

机译：第三方激励措施在僵持局面中的作用：对成熟度理论的批评。

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摘要

This study examines and compares two prominent models related to the timing and conduct of negotiations to resolve protracted conflicts: the mutually hurting stalemate and the enticing opportunity models. Two theories that specifically spotlight the timing of the initiation and resolution of hard-to-resolve conflicts, ripeness theory and readiness theory, are reviewed in detail. Using simulated negotiations, the study then examines the effects of offering third-party positive incentives to conflicting parties in a civil war situation.;Two dichotomies are employed in this study: low hurt/high hurt and weak incentives/substantial incentives. I hypothesized that generally incentives would positively influence a conflict party to negotiate and settle in a high hurt situation. Based on this proposition and Zartman's (2000) revised ripeness theory, two further hypotheses were developed and tested. The first proposed that under weak incentives high hurt groups would be more reluctant to negotiate and conceded than low hurt groups, because of resistant reactions. The proposition for the second hypothesis is that substantial incentives would counteract resistant reactions and encourage high hurt groups more than low hurt groups.;A two by two factorial design involving two levels of hurt (high and low) and two levels of third-party incentives (weak and substantial) was developed to test the hypotheses. The simulate negotiation study involved sixty-six African students from American and African universities. Two independent variables were manipulated---level of hurt and strength of third part incentives---and four main dependent variables were measured by means of questionnaires---willingness to negotiate, willingness to conceded, willingness to reach agreement, and perceived concession making during the negotiation.;Resistant reactions did not occur under weak incentives hence, hurt was not a factor in encouraging parties to negotiate and make concessions. But non-significant trends showed a nearly-significant finding that high hurt groups believed that both parties had conceded more than low hurt groups.;For hypothesis two, it was found that high hurt groups were significantly more willing to negotiate than low hurt groups. This supports Zartman's (1989) original ripeness theory, which postulates that a hurting stalemate will produce greater willingness to negotiate, hurt was a factor in participants' willingness to negotiate and that high hurt group were more willing than low hurt groups, suggesting that resistant reaction may have occurred. This hurt effect was somewhat larger when substantial as opposed to weak incentives were offered. This effect did not reach significance, but was in the direction of hypothesis two, suggesting that the high incentives may have dispelled resistant reactions in some participants. However, parties were not willing to agree to make concessions ahead of negotiation, perhaps because they were experiencing resistant reactions. There was also a non-significant trend towards more willingness to concede under high as opposed to low hurt, again providing some support for Zartman's (1989) original ripeness theory.;There was a statistical significance for perceived concessions made and received during the negotiation; suggesting that hurt may have been a factor in actual concession making. Participants believed that they made and received greater concessions under high hurt than under low hurt when they were offered weak incentives. This supports Pruitt's (200030 extension of Zartman's original ripeness theory to concession making during negotiation. There were not statistically significant findings for willingness to reach agreement, but non-statistical findings showed that participants were more willing to reach agreement when offered substantial incentives under high hurt than under low hurt. This also is in the direction of hypothesis two.
机译：这项研究检查并比较了与解决持久冲突的谈判时机和进行有关的两个主要模型：相互伤害的僵局和诱人的机会模型。详细讨论了两个理论，它们专门介绍了难以解决的冲突的发生和解决的时机，即成熟度理论和准备状态理论。该研究使用模拟谈判，然后研究了在内战情况下向冲突各方提供第三方积极激励措施的效果。该研究采用了两种二分法：低伤害/高伤害和弱激励/实质激励。我假设，一般而言，激励措施将对冲突方产生积极影响，以使其在遭受严重伤害的情况下进行谈判和解决。基于这个命题和Zartman（2000）修订的成熟度理论，进一步提出了两个假设并进行了检验。第一个建议是，在低激励措施下，高伤害群体比起低伤害群体，由于抵抗性反应，更不愿意谈判和让步。第二个假设的命题是，实质性激励措施将抵制抵抗性反应并鼓励高伤害群体多于低伤害群体。;由两个伤害因素（高和低）和两个第三方激励因素组成的二乘二因子设计（弱和实质）被开发出来以检验假设。模拟谈判研究涉及来自美国和非洲大学的66名非洲学生。操纵了两个自变量-伤害程度和第三方激励的强度-并通过问卷调查了四个主要因变量-谈判的意愿，让步的意愿，达成协议的意愿以及让步的意愿在激励措施薄弱的情况下不会发生抵制反应，因此，伤害并不是鼓励各方进行谈判和做出让步的因素。但是不显着的趋势表明，近乎重要的发现是，高伤害群体认为双方都比低伤害群体承认更多。；对于假设二，发现高伤害群体比低伤害群体更愿意进行谈判。这支持了Zartman（1989）的原始成熟度理论，该理论认为，陷入僵局的僵局将产生更大的谈判意愿，而伤害是参与者进行谈判的意愿的一个因素，并且高伤害的群体比低伤害的群体更愿意，这表明存在抵抗力可能发生了。当提供实质性奖励而不是弱性奖励时，这种伤害效应会更大。该作用没有达到显着性，但在假设二的方向上，表明高激励可能消除了一些参与者的抗药性反应。但是，当事方不愿意在谈判之前做出让步，这也许是因为他们正在遭受抵制反应。在高伤害下而不是低伤害下，更愿意让步的趋势也不显着，这再次为Zartman（1989）的原始成熟理论提供了一定的支持。暗示伤害可能是做出实际让步的一个因素。参与者认为，当他们获得较弱的激励时，他们在受到高伤害的情况下比在受到低伤害的情况下做出了更大的让步。这支持了普鲁伊特（200030）将扎特曼的原始成熟度理论扩展到谈判中的让步。在统计上没有发现愿意达成协议的结果，但非统计结果表明，参与者在受到高额伤害的情况下提供实质性激励时更愿意达成协议比受到低伤害的情况要好。这也是假设二的方向。

著录项

  • 作者

    Ekwuachi-Ford, Stella.;

  • 作者单位

    George Mason University.;

  • 授予单位 George Mason University.;
  • 学科 Sociology Theory and Methods.;Philosophy.;Political Science International Law and Relations.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2009
  • 页码 303 p.
  • 总页数 303
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 社会学理论与方法论;哲学理论;国际法;
  • 关键词

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