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首页> 外文期刊>The Antitrust Bulletin >Monopsony Power and Guest Worker Programs
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Monopsony Power and Guest Worker Programs

机译：垄断力量和客工计划

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摘要

Guest workers on visas in the United States may be unable to quit bad employers due to barriers to mobility and a lack of labor market competition. Using H-1B, H-2A, and H-2B program data, we calculate the concentration of employers in geographically defined labor markets within occupations. We find that many guest workers face moderately or highly concentrated labor markets, based on federal merger scrutiny guidelines, and that concentration generally decreases wages. For example, moving from a market with a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of zero to a market comprised of two employers lowers H-1B worker wages approximately 10%, and a pure monopsony (one employer) reduces wages by 13%. A simulation shows that wages under pure monopsony could be 47% lower, suggesting that employers do not use the full extent of their monopsony power. Enforcing wage regulations and decreasing barriers to mobility may better address issues of exploitation than antitrust scrutiny alone.
机译：由于行动不便和缺乏劳动力市场竞争，在美国持签证工作的来宾工人可能无法辞退不良雇主。使用H-1B，H-2A和H-2B计划数据，我们可以计算出职业中按地理位置划分的劳动力市场中雇主的集中度。我们发现，根据联邦兼并审查指南，许多来宾工人面临中等或高度集中的劳动力市场，而且集中度通常会降低工资。例如，从Herfindahl-Hirschman指数为零的市场过渡到由两个雇主组成的市场，会使H-1B工人的工资降低约10％，而纯粹的独裁者（一个雇主）会使工资降低13％。模拟显示，纯一夫一妻制下的工资可能会降低47％，这表明雇主没有充分利用其一心一意的权力。加强工资法规和减少流动性障碍，可能比单独进行反托拉斯审查更好地解决剥削问题。

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