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Equilibrium Analysis of Vertical Mergers

机译：垂直合并的平衡分析

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Vertical mergers are known to potentially create an incentive for the merged firm to raise the price of inputs it supplies to its rivals (raising rivals’ cost [RRC]). At the same time, vertical mergers are known to create efficiencies in the form of elimination of double marginalization (EDM). Competitive effects of vertical mergers are evaluated as the net effect of RRC and EDM. Conventional antitrust techniques treat the two effects—RRC and EDM—as separable and analyze each in isolation before evaluating their net effect. We show that in an equilibrium treatment, RRC and EDM are not separable; instead, they are inseparably linked because the size of EDM is an important determinant of the strength of the RRC incentive. When the link between EDM and RRC is taken into account, predicted price effects of a vertical merger can turn out to be significantly different relative to those predicted by conventional techniques. Under certain commonly used assumptions, a vertical merger may even create an incentive for the merged firm to lower its rivals’ cost. The precise price effect depends on two things: the shape of demand and the bargaining power of the upstream input supplier in its price negotiations with downstream firms.
机译：众所周知，垂直兼并可能为合并的公司提高其提供给其竞争对手的投入价格（提高竞争对手的成本[RRC]）。同时，已知垂直合并以消除双边缘化（EDM）的形式产生效率。垂直合并的竞争效果被评估为RRC和EDM的净效应。常规的反托拉斯技术在评估其净效应之前将两种效应-RRC和EDM - 分离分离，并分析。我们表明，在均衡处理中，RRC和EDM不可分离;相反，它们是保持联系的，因为EDM的大小是RRC激励强度强度的重要决定因素。当考虑EDM和RRC之间的链路时，垂直合并的预测价格效果可以与传统技术预测的那些相对于预测的值表示显着不同。在某些常用的假设下，垂直合并甚至可能为合并的公司筹集了激励，以降低其竞争对手的成本。精确的价格效果取决于两件事：需求的形状和上游输入供应商的议价能力与下游公司的价格谈判。

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