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Organizational discretion, board control, and shareholder wealth: A contingency perspective

机译：组织自由裁量权，董事会控制和股东财富：应急视角

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Research Question/IssueHow does organizational context influence the impact of board control over managerial decisions on shareholder wealth?Research Findings/InsightsWe introduce a new theoretical conceptorganizational discretionto characterize the upper limit of managers' latitude of actions presented by their organizational context and propose that it moderates the impact of board control on shareholder wealth. Specifically, we first argue that strategic control by boards over managerial decisions reduces managers' latitude of actions and leads to tradeoffs between the containment of managerial opportunism and the pursuit of strategic opportunities, which consequently influence the relationship between strategic control and shareholder wealth. We then suggest that the tradeoffs incurred by strategic control over managerial decisions are more prominent in firms with high organizational discretion. Because of the tradeoffs, we propose that boards are likely to decide whether to rely more on strategic control or financial control in internal corporate governance based on their firms' level of organizational discretion.Theoretical/Academic ImplicationsBy introducing the concept of organizational discretion and highlighting the tradeoffs caused by boards' strategic control over managerial decisions, we advance a contingency perspective to enhance the understanding about the impact of board control on shareholder wealth. It also bridges the strategic management and corporate governance research on managerial discretion that has largely evolved separately in the literature.Practitioner/Policy ImplicationsBoards should attend to the tradeoffs between the containment of managerial opportunism and the pursuit of strategic opportunities when exercising strategic control over managerial decisions. Moreover, considering the tradeoffs involved, boards should carefully design and implement internal corporate governance mechanisms based on their firms' level of organizational discretion.
机译：研究问题/问题组织背景会影响董事会对股东财富的管理决策的影响吗？研究发现/ Insightswe引入了一种新的理论概念酌情自由裁量权，以其组织背景提出的管理者纬度的上限，并提出了它适度的董事会控制对股东财富的影响。具体而言，我们首先争辩说，董事会在管理决策上的战略控制减少了管理人员的行动纬度，并导致遏制管理机会主义和追求战略机会之间的权衡，这影响了战略控制与股东财富之间的关系。然后，我们建议战略控制对管理决策产生的权衡在具有高组织自由裁量权的公司方面更加突出。由于权衡，我们提出了基于其公司组织自行决定的内部公司治理的战略控制或财务控制，从而依赖于其组织自行决定。理论/学术含义介绍组织自行决定，并突出概念董事会对管理层战略控制造成的权衡，我们推进了应急视角，以加强对董事会控制对股东财富影响的理解。它还巩固了战略管理和公司治理研究，这些战略管理和公司治理研究在基本上在文献中分开进化了.Practitioner /政策含义应该在行使战略控制的战略控制时，应对管理机会主义的遏制和追求战略机会之间的权衡。此外，考虑到所涉及的权衡，董事会应根据其公司的组织自行决定，仔细设计和实施内部公司治理机制。

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