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Organizational discretion, board control, and shareholder wealth: A contingency perspective

机译:组织自由裁量权,董事会控制权和股东财富:权变观点

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Research Question/IssueHow does organizational context influence the impact of board control over managerial decisions on shareholder wealth?Research Findings/InsightsWe introduce a new theoretical conceptorganizational discretionto characterize the upper limit of managers' latitude of actions presented by their organizational context and propose that it moderates the impact of board control on shareholder wealth. Specifically, we first argue that strategic control by boards over managerial decisions reduces managers' latitude of actions and leads to tradeoffs between the containment of managerial opportunism and the pursuit of strategic opportunities, which consequently influence the relationship between strategic control and shareholder wealth. We then suggest that the tradeoffs incurred by strategic control over managerial decisions are more prominent in firms with high organizational discretion. Because of the tradeoffs, we propose that boards are likely to decide whether to rely more on strategic control or financial control in internal corporate governance based on their firms' level of organizational discretion.Theoretical/Academic ImplicationsBy introducing the concept of organizational discretion and highlighting the tradeoffs caused by boards' strategic control over managerial decisions, we advance a contingency perspective to enhance the understanding about the impact of board control on shareholder wealth. It also bridges the strategic management and corporate governance research on managerial discretion that has largely evolved separately in the literature.Practitioner/Policy ImplicationsBoards should attend to the tradeoffs between the containment of managerial opportunism and the pursuit of strategic opportunities when exercising strategic control over managerial decisions. Moreover, considering the tradeoffs involved, boards should carefully design and implement internal corporate governance mechanisms based on their firms' level of organizational discretion.
机译:研究问题/问题组织背景如何影响董事会对管理层决策的控制对股东财富的影响研究结果/见解我们引入了一种新的理论概念组织自由裁量权来表征经理根据组织背景提出的行动自由度的上限并建议适度董事会控制对股东财富的影响。具体而言,我们首先提出,董事会对管理决策的战略控制会降低管理者的行动自由度,并导致在遏制管理机会主义和追求战略机会之间进行权衡,从而影响战略控制与股东财富之间的关系。然后我们建议,在具有较高组织自由度的公司中,对管理决策进行战略控制所产生的权衡更为突出。由于存在权衡因素,我们建议董事会可能根据其公司的组织自由裁量水平来决定在内部公司治理中是更依赖战略控制还是财务控制。理论/学术意义通过引入组织自由裁量权的概念并强调由于董事会对管理层决策的战略控制权衡而产生的权衡取舍,我们提出了一种权变观点,以加深对董事会控制权对股东财富影响的理解。它还将战略管理与公司治理研究之间的管理自由裁量权(在文献中已分别发展)之间架起了桥梁。从业者/政策含义董事会在对管理决策进行战略控制时应注意控制机会主义的遏制与战略机会的追求之间的权衡。此外,考虑到所涉及的权衡,董事会应根据其公司的组织自由裁量水平精心设计和实施内部公司治理机制。

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