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Military confidence-building in crises: lessons from Georgia and Ukraine

机译：危机中的军事信心建设：乔治亚州和乌克兰的课程

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摘要

What role can conventional arms control (CAC) and confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) play in crises and conflicts? By examining the use of CAC and CSBMs during the Russian-Georgian war in 2008 and during Russia's annexation of Crimea and the war in eastern Ukraine in 2014, the present article argue that CAC and CSBMs are unable to prevent intentional conflict. Their more realistic value in crises is to function as early warning mechanisms that raise the bar for and increase the costs of conflict as well as serving as instruments to monitor conflicts. To increase their effectiveness, the links between early warning and early action need strengthening and several ambiguities need to be removed, particularly form the Vienna Document, in order to improve indicators, increase warning times and raise the political costs of non-compliance. Nonetheless, when one or two sides seek a conflict, CAC and CSBMs do not provide a remedy for conflict prevention.
机译：常规武器控制（CAC）和信心和安全建设措施（CSBMS）在危机和冲突中发挥的作用是什么？通过审查2008年俄罗斯 - 格鲁吉亚战争期间的CAC和CSBMS的使用，并在俄罗斯在2014年在乌克兰东部的战争和战争期间，本文认为CAC和CSBMS无法阻止有意冲突。他们在危机中更现实的价值是用作提高栏的预警机制，并增加冲突成本以及作为监测冲突的仪器。为了提高其有效性，需要删除早期预警和早期行动之间的联系，特别是拆除有几种模糊，特别是维也纳文件，以改善指标，提高警告时间并提高不合规的政治成本。尽管如此，当一个或双方寻求冲突时，CAC和CSBMS没有提供预防冲突的补救措施。

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