首页> 外文期刊>Economic Theory >Optimal sale across venues and auctions with a buy-now option
【24h】

Optimal sale across venues and auctions with a buy-now option

机译:带有立即购买选项的跨场馆和拍卖的最佳销售

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           

摘要

We characterize the optimal selling mechanism for a seller who faces demand demarcated by a high and a low end and who can access an (online) auction site (by paying an access cost) in addition to using his own store that can be used as a posted price selling venue. We first solve for the optimal mechanism of a direct revelation game in which there is no venue-restriction constraint. We find that the direct optimal mechanism must necessarily incorporate a certain kind of pooling. We then show that even with the venue constraint, the seller can use a two stage indirect mechanism that implements the allocation rule from the optimal direct mechanism, and uses the venues in an optimal fashion. The first stage of the indirect mechanism is a posted price at the store. If the object is not sold, we move to stage two, which involves an auction at the auction site. A feature of this auction is a buy-now option which is essential for implementing the pooling feature of the optimal direct mechanism. We also show that the buy-now option in the optimal mechanism is of a “temporary” variety, and that a “permanent” buy-now option, in contrast, cannot implement the optimal mechanism. Auctions with a temporary buy-now option are in widespread use on eBay.
机译:对于那些面临由高端和低端界定的需求,并且除了可以使用自己的商店之外,还可以访问(在线)拍卖站点(通过支付访问成本)的卖家,我们描述了一种最佳的销售机制。发布价格销售地点。我们首先解决没有场地限制约束的直接启示游戏的最佳机制。我们发现直接最优机制必须必然包含某种类型的合并。然后,我们证明,即使受到场所约束,卖方也可以使用两阶段间接机制,该机制从最佳直接机制实施分配规则,并以最佳方式使用场所。间接机制的第一阶段是在商店中发布价格。如果未出售该物品,则进入第二阶段,该阶段涉及在拍卖现场进行拍卖。该拍卖的一个特征是“立即购买”选项,这对于实现最佳直接机制的合并功能至关重要。我们还表明,最佳机制中的“立即购买”选项具有“临时”变化,而“永久”立即购买的选项则不能实现最佳机制。具有临时购买选项的拍卖在eBay上得到广泛使用。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号