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Post-IPO governance and top management team rent generation and appropriation

机译:首次公开募股后治理和高层管理团队租金的产生和分配

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摘要

Using resource-based logic as well as stewardship and agency theories, we address a paradox when governing young firms-how to design governance structures to encourage top managers to generate rents while minimizing the threat of rent appropriation. Some corporate governance mechanisms (CGMs) enhance empowerment and encourage managers to generate rents for the firm. But these CGMs may also allow managers to appropriate rents excessively. The solution appears to be combining CGMs that empower managers to generate rents with CGMs that either (a) motivate stewardship behavior or (b) reduce information asymmetry between management and other stakeholders. Our empirical analyses provide substantial support for our predictions.
机译:使用基于资源的逻辑以及管理和代理理论,我们在管理年轻公司时解决了一个悖论,即如何设计治理结构以鼓励高层管理人员产生租金,同时最大程度地减少租金分配的威胁。一些公司治理机制(CGM)增强了能力,并鼓励管理人员为公司产生租金。但是,这些CGM可能还允许管理人员过多地调整租金。解决方案似乎是将CGM与授权经理与CGM结合使用,CGM可以(a)激发管理行为,或者(b)减少管理层与其他利益相关者之间的信息不对称。我们的经验分析为我们的预测提供了实质性支持。

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