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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of economic theory >Optimal Voting Schemes With Costly Informationacquisition
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Optimal Voting Schemes With Costly Informationacquisition

机译：信息获取成本高的最优投票方案

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摘要

A group of individuals with identical preferences must make a decision under uncertainty about which decision is best. Before the decision is made, each agent can privately acquire a costly and imperfect signal. We discuss how to design a mechanism for eliciting and aggregating the collected information so as to maximize ex-ante social welfare. We first show that, of all mechanisms, a sequential one is optimal and works as follows. At random, one agent at a time is selected to acquire information and report the resulting signal. Agents are informed of neither their position in the sequence nor of other reports. Acquiring information when called upon and reporting truthfully is an equilibrium. We next characterize the ex-ante optimal scheme among all ex-post efficient mechanisms. In this mechanism, a decision is made when the precision of the posterior exceeds a cut-off that decreases with each additional report. The restriction to ex-post efficiency is shown to be without loss when the available signals are sufficiently imprecise. On the other hand, ex-post efficient mechanisms are shown to be suboptimal when the cost of information acquisition is sufficiently small.
机译：具有相同偏好的一群人必须在不确定哪个决策最好的情况下做出决策。在做出决定之前，每个代理可以私下获取昂贵且不完善的信号。我们讨论了如何设计一种机制来引发和汇总所收集的信息，从而最大化事前的社会福利。我们首先表明，在所有机制中，顺序机制是最佳的，其工作原理如下。随机地，一次选择一个代理以获取信息并报告所产生的信号。不会向代理通知他们在顺序中的位置或其他报告。在要求时获取信息并如实报告是一种平衡。接下来，我们将描述所有事后有效机制中的事前最优方案。在这种机制中，当后验的精度超过每个附加报告而降低的临界值时，就做出决定。当可用信号足够不精确时，对事后效率的限制显示为无损失。另一方面，当信息获取的成本足够小时，事后高效机制显示为次优。

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