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Iterated potential and robustness of equilibria

机译:迭代电位和平衡的鲁棒性

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摘要

For any given set-valued solution concept, it is possible to consider iterative elimination of actions outside the solution set. This paper applies such a procedure to define the concept of iterated monotone potential maximizer (iterated MP-maximizer). It is shown that under some monotonicity conditions, an iterated MP-maximizer is robust to incomplete information [A. Kajii, S. Morris, The robustness of equilibria to incomplete information, Econometrica 65 (1997) 1283-1309] and absorbing and globally accessible under perfect foresight dynamics for a small friction [A. Matsui, K. Matsuyama, An approach to equilibrium selection, J. Econ. Theory 65 (1995) 415-434]. Several simple sufficient conditions under which a game has an iterated MP-maximizer are also provided.
机译:对于任何给定的集值解决方案概念,可以考虑迭代消除解决方案集之外的动作。本文采用这样的程序来定义迭代单调电势最大化器(迭代MP最大化器)的概念。结果表明,在某些单调性条件下,迭代的MP最大化器对于不完整的信息具有鲁棒性。 Kajii,S. Morris,对不完全信息的均衡的鲁棒性,《计量经济学》(Econometrica)65(1997)1283-1309],以及在完美的前瞻性动力学下吸收和全局访问的摩擦力很小[A. Matsui,K。Matsuyama,《均衡选择的一种方法》,J。Econ。理论65(1995)415-434]。还提供了游戏具有迭代MP最大化器的几个简单的充分条件。

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