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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of economic theory >Incentive Efficient Risk Sharing In A Settlement Mechanism
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Incentive Efficient Risk Sharing In A Settlement Mechanism

机译：结算机制中的激励有效风险分担

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摘要

The purpose of this paper is to address a question concerning risk management in continuing, multi-party, contractual, clearing and settlement arrangements through which large-value payments are typically made. We are particularly interested in the issues of incentive compatibility when a third party possesses a private information concerning the riskiness of transfers being made. If a third party possesses private information that would be of value in determining how best to settle a payment, how does the exposure of that party to the settlement risk affect the quality of information that the party chooses to provide? In this paper, we address this question by analyzing a specific class of parametric environments of a schematic, formal, model of a settlement arrangement or a payment network.
机译：本文的目的是解决有关持续，多方，合同，清算和结算安排中的风险管理的问题，通过该安排通常进行大额支付。当第三方拥有有关转移风险的私人信息时，我们对激励兼容性的问题特别感兴趣。如果第三方拥有对确定如何最好地结算付款具有价值的私人信息，那么该第三方承担的结算风险将如何影响该方选择提供的信息质量？在本文中，我们通过分析结算安排或支付网络的示意图，形式，模型的特定类别的参数环境来解决此问题。

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