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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of institutional economics >Citizens-experts' interactions under different institutional arrangements: assessing the role of uncertainty, interests, and values
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Citizens-experts' interactions under different institutional arrangements: assessing the role of uncertainty, interests, and values

机译：不同制度安排下的公民专家互动：评估不确定性，利益和价值的作用

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摘要

In this paper, we develop a framework to analyze the relationship between evidence and policy. Postulating a normative criterion based on cost-benefit analysis and the value of a piece of information, as well as a topology of the policy space defined by three characteristics (epistemic uncertainty, interests, and the degree of value conflicts), we identify the (Nash) equilibria of an interaction between experts and citizens in providing information to a decision maker. In this setup, we study three institutional arrangements (evidence-based policy, deliberative governance, and negotiated conflict) that differ in terms of reliance on experts and citizens for providing information. We show that different degrees of uncertainty, interests, and value-relevance surrounding the issue at stake result in vastly different arrangement performances; hence, to foster efficiency, rules should be contingent.
机译：在本文中，我们开发了一个框架来分析证据与政策之间的关系。根据成本效益分析和一条信息的价值，以及由三个特征（流行病的不确定性，利益和价值冲突程度）定义的政策空间的拓扑结构，假设一个规范性标准，我们确定（纳什（Nash）在专家和公民之间互动的平衡，向决策者提供信息。在此设置中，我们研究了三种制度安排（基于证据的政策，审议性治理和谈判中的冲突），它们在依赖专家和公民提供信息方面有所不同。我们表明，围绕所关注问题的程度不同的不确定性，兴趣和价值相关性会导致安排绩效大相径庭；因此，为了提高效率，规则应视情况而定。

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