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Vertical Integration, Exclusivity, and Game Sales Performance in the US Video Game Industry

机译：美国视频游戏行业的垂直整合，排他性和游戏销售业绩

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This article empirically investigates the relation between vertical integration and game performance in the US video game industry. For this purpose, we use a data set on video game monthly sales from 2000 to 2007. We complement these data with information on game developers and the timing of all mergers and acquisitions during that period allowing us to separate vertically integrated games from independent games exclusive to a platform. First, we show that integrated games are associated with higher sales and higher prices than independent games. Second, we find suggestive evidence that most of the difference in performance is due to better release strategies and selection in game quality. We show that post-release marketing strategies do not seem to add value to vertically integrated games. Finally, we also find that exclusivity is associated with lower demand and higher prices due to lower inherent quality and better release strategies, respectively.
机译：本文对美国视频游戏行业的垂直整合与游戏性能之间的关系进行了实证研究。为此，我们使用了2000年至2007年视频游戏月度销售的数据集。我们将这些数据与游戏开发商的信息以及该时期内所有并购的时间进行了补充，从而使我们能够将垂直整合游戏与独立游戏独家到平台。首先，我们证明集成游戏比独立游戏具有更高的销售额和更高的价格。其次，我们发现暗示性的证据表明，大多数性能差异是由于更好的发布策略和游戏质量的选择所致。我们证明，发布后的营销策略似乎并不能为垂直整合的游戏增加价值。最后，我们还发现，排他性分别由于较低的固有质量和较好的释放策略而与较低的需求和较高的价格相关。

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