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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of regulatory economics >A theory of social license when regulatory pressure is jointly produced by an EPA and an NGO
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A theory of social license when regulatory pressure is jointly produced by an EPA and an NGO

机译：当EPA和NGO共同施加监管压力时的社会许可理论

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摘要

We develop a model in which social pressure on a firm to behave well is jointly produced by a state regulator (EPA) and an NGO. The EPA and NGO differ in how they trade-off business versus environmental interests and also have access to different instruments in pursuit of their objectives. In particular, while the EPA will typically have the tools for detecting misbehaviour, the NGO can influence the intensity of social hostility directed towards those found to have misbehaved. EPA and NGO efforts may be strategic complements or substitutes, depending upon circumstances. We present a taxonomy of outcomes in the game between EPA and NGO in the spirit of Fudenberg and Tiroles's (Am Econ Rev Pap Proc 74(2):361-366, 1984) classic taxonomy of business strategies. We also consider strategic delegation from NGO supporters to an NGO that has tastes over environmental and business interests different to their own.
机译：我们开发了一种模型，在模型中，国家监管机构（EPA）和非政府组织共同对企业的良好行为施加社会压力。 EPA和NGO在权衡业务与环境利益方面的方式有所不同，并且在实现其目标方面也可以使用不同的手段。特别是，尽管EPA通常将具有检测不良行为的工具，但NGO可以影响针对行为不端者的社会敌对程度。 EPA和NGO的努力可能视情况而定是战略的补充或替代。我们本着Fudenberg和Tiroles（Am Econ Rev Pap Proc 74（2）：361-366，1984）经典业务策略分类的精神，介绍EPA和NGO之间的博弈结果分类。我们还考虑了从非政府组织支持者到非政府组织的战略授权，该非政府组织对环境和商业利益的偏好与其自身不同。

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