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首页> 外文期刊>The Manchester school >STRATEGIC CAPACITY INVESTMENT UNDER HOLD-UP THREATS: THE ROLE OF CONTRACT LENGTH AND WIDTH
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STRATEGIC CAPACITY INVESTMENT UNDER HOLD-UP THREATS: THE ROLE OF CONTRACT LENGTH AND WIDTH

机译:持续威胁下的战略能力投资:合同长度和宽度的作用

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摘要

We analyze the impact of the length of incomplete contracts on investment and surplus sharing. In the bilateral relationship explored, the seller controls the input and the buyer invests. With two-part tariffs, the length of the contract is irrelevant: the surplus is maximal and goes to the seller. In linear contracts, the seller prefers the shortest contract and the buyer the longest one. Further, the commitment period concentrates the incentives, whereas afterwards there is rent extraction. The socially efficient contract is as short as possible; yet, long contracts can be promoted because of the surplus they allocate to the buyer.
机译:我们分析了不完整合同的期限对投资和盈余分享的影响。在探讨的双边关系中,卖方控制投入,买方进行投资。对于分为两部分的费率,合同的期限无关紧要:剩余量最大,并且归卖方所有。在线性合同中,卖方更喜欢最短的合同,而买方则喜欢最长的合同。此外,承诺期集中了激励措施,而之后有租金提取。具有社会效益的合同越短越好;但是,由于长期合同分配给买方,因此可以促进长期合同。

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  • 来源
    《The Manchester school》 |2016年第3期|313-339|共27页
  • 作者单位

    Univ Paris 09, F-75775 Paris 16, France;

    Univ Paris 09, F-75775 Paris 16, France|CREST, Pune, Maharashtra, India;

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  • 正文语种 eng
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