In this paper we analyze the optimal incentive contracts under imperfect auditing. Both principal's commitment and no commitment to auditing cases are investigated. In the commitment case, the Baron-Besanko-type (RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 15 (1984), pp. 447-470) contract would fail under imperfect auditing. In the no-commitment case, the Baron-Myerson (Econometrica, Vol. 50 (1982), pp. 911-930) and the Khalil-type (RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 28 (1997), pp. 629-640) contracts could survive under specific misjudging probabilities. In addition, there exists a separate equilibrium with the agent's full compliance and the principal's sure ex post auditing.
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机译：本文分析了不完全审计下的最优激励合同。校长对审计案件的承诺和不承诺的情况都将进行调查。在承诺情况下，Baron-Besanko型（RAND经济学期刊，第15卷（1984年），第447-470页）合同在不完善的审计下将失败。在无承诺的情况下，Baron-Myerson（Econometrica，第50卷（1982），第911-930页）和Khalil型（RAND Journal of Economics，第28卷（1997），第629-640页） ）合同可以在特定的误判概率下生存。此外，代理人的完全合规性与委托人的事后审计肯定存在单独的平衡。
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