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Dynamic Pricing in the Presence of Myopic and Strategic Consumers: Theory and Experiment

机译：具有近视和战略消费者的动态定价：理论与实验

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摘要

We investigate retailers' dynamic pricing decisions in a stylized two-period setting with possible supply constraints and demand from both myopic and strategic consumers. We present an analytical model and then test its predictions in a behavioral experiment in which human subjects played the role of pricing managers. We find that the fraction of strategic consumers in the market systematically moderates the optimal pricing structure. When this fraction exceeds a certain threshold, the retailer offers relatively small late season markdowns to discourage strategic consumers from waiting and to incentivize them to buy during the early season; otherwise, the retailer offers relatively large markdowns to divert all strategic consumers to the late season, where the majority of revenue is made. Our model analyses suggest that the latter policy is optimal under fairly broad conditions. Our experiment shows that after some significant learning, aggregate behavior is able to approximate the key qualitative predictions from our model analysis, with one notable deviation: in the presence of a mixture of myopic and strategic consumers, subjects act somewhat myopically - they underprice and oversell in the main selling season, which significantly limits their ability to generate revenue in the markdown season.
机译：我们在程式化的两个阶段中调查零售商的动态定价决策，可能会受到近视和战略消费者的供应限制和需求。我们提出一个分析模型，然后在一个行为实验中测试其预测，在该行为实验中，人类受试者扮演了价格管理者的角色。我们发现，战略消费者在市场中的份额会系统地调节最优定价结构。当该比例超过一定阈值时，零售商会提供相对较小的后期降价促销，以阻止战略性消费者等待，并激励他们在早期购买。否则，零售商会提供相对较大的减价幅度，以将所有战略消费者转移到收入大部分的后期。我们的模型分析表明，后一种政策在相当广泛的条件下是最佳的。我们的实验表明，经过大量的学习之后，总体行为能够近似地根据我们的模型分析得出关键的定性预测，但有一个明显的偏差：在存在近视和战略性消费者的混合物的情况下，受试者的行为有些近视-他们低估了价格并超卖了在主要销售季节，这大大限制了他们在降价销售季节产生收入的能力。

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