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Being realistic about common knowledge: a Lewisian approach

机译：关于常识的现实主义：路易斯式方法

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Defined and formalized several decades ago, widely used in philosophy and game theory, the concept of common knowledge is still considered as problematic, although not always for the right reasons. I suggest that the epistemic status of a group of human agents in a state of common knowledge has not been thoroughly analyzed. In particular, every existing account of common knowledge, whether formal or not, is either too strong to fit cognitively limited individuals, or too weak to adequately describe their state. I provide a realistic definition of common knowledge, based on a formalization of David Lewis’ seminal account and show that it is formally equivalent to probabilistic common belief. This leads to a philosophical analysis of common knowledge which answers several common criticisms and sheds light on its nature.
机译：几十年前定义和形式化，广泛用于哲学和博弈论中，尽管并非总是出于正确的原因，但常识的概念仍然被认为是有问题的。我认为，尚未对一组处于常识状态的人类行为者的认知状态进行彻底分析。尤其是，现有的每一个常识性知识，无论是正式知识还是非正式知识，要么太强壮以致无法适应认知能力有限的个人，要么太虚弱而无法充分描述其状态。我根据戴维·刘易斯（David Lewis）开创性的陈述的形式化，对常识进行了现实的定义，并表明它在形式上等同于概率常识。这导致对常识的哲学分析，它回答了几种常见的批评并阐明了其本质。

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