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Urban Networks with Ring Roads: Two-Level, Three-Player Game

机译:环城公路网:两层,三层博弈

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摘要

The integrated traffic control and traffic assignment problem is studied for a situation with two road authorities. Road authorities try to optimize their own objectives, and the same is done by road users. The result is a two-level, three-player multistage optimization problem with complete information. Game theory gives a suitable framework to analyze the problem and to find solutions for different situations such as no cooperation, cooperation between the two authorities, and a system optimum in which all actors cooperate to minimize the total costs for all travelers. Two approaches are used: an analytical approach and one based on a simulation and assignment framework. Both approaches are described and used to study a simple example, for which the results are given and discussed. The results show that separate or integrated anticipatory control gives better results than iterative reaction to the current situation. If one road authority takes the lead and anticipates the reactions of both the road users and the other road authority, a suboptimum is reached. The model calculations provide evidence that cooperation of road authorities improves utilization of the infrastructure and that global optimization does not necessarily result in a worse situation for one road authority.
机译:研究了具有两个道路当局的情况下的综合交通控制和交通分配问题。道路当局试图优化自己的目标,道路使用者也这样做。结果是具有完整信息的两级,三人多阶段优化问题。博弈论提供了一个合适的框架来分析问题并找到针对不同情况的解决方案,例如不合作,两国当局之间的合作以及所有参与者进行合作以使所有旅行者的总成本降至最低的最佳系统。使用两种方法:一种分析方法,一种基于模拟和分配框架。描述和使用了这两种方法来研究一个简单的示例,给出并讨论了结果。结果表明,对于当前情况,单独或集成的预期控制比迭代反应提供更好的结果。如果一个道路主管部门牵头并预期道路使用者和另一道路主管部门的反应,则会达到次优状态。模型计算提供的证据表明,道路主管部门的合作可以改善基础设施的利用率,并且全局优化不一定会导致一个道路主管部门的情况恶化。

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