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首页> 外文期刊>The Review of Economic Studies >Learning from a Piece of PiePIERRE-ANDRE CHIAPPORIColumbia University
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Learning from a Piece of PiePIERRE-ANDRE CHIAPPORIColumbia University

机译：向哥伦比亚大学的PiePIERRE-ANDRE CHIAPPORI学习

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摘要

We investigate the empirical content of the Nash solution to two-player bargaining games. The bargaining environment is described by a set of variables that may affect agents' preferences over the agreement sharing, the status quo outcome, or both. The outcomes (i.e. whether an agreement is reached, and if so the individual shares) and the environment (including the size of the pie) are known, but neither are the agents' utilities nor their threat points. We consider both a deterministic version of the model in which the econometrician observes the shares as deterministic functions of the variables under consideration and a stochastic one in which because of latent disturbances only the joint distribution of incomes and outcomes is recorded. We show that in the most general framework any outcome can be rationalized as a Nash solution. However, even mild exclusion restrictions generate strong implications that can be used to test the Nash bargaining assumption. Stronger conditions further allow to recover the underlying structure of the bargaining, and in particular, the cardinal representation of individual preferences in the absence of uncertainty. An implication of this finding is that empirical works entailing Nash bargaining could (and should) use much more general and robust versions than they usually do.
机译：我们调查了纳什解决方案用于两人讨价还价游戏的经验内容。讨价还价环境由一组变量来描述，这些变量可能会影响代理对协议共享的偏好，现状的结果，或两者兼而有之。结果（即是否达成协议，如果达成，则是个人股份）和环境（包括饼图的大小）是已知的，但代理商的效用或威胁点都不是。我们既考虑模型的确定性版本，即计量经济学家将份额视为所考虑变量的确定性函数，也考虑了随机性，其中由于潜在干扰，仅记录收入和结果的联合分配。我们表明，在最通用的框架中，任何结果都可以合理化为Nash解决方案。但是，即使是轻微的排除限制也会产生强烈的暗示，可以用来检验纳什议价假设。更强的条件进一步允许恢复谈判的基本结构，尤其是在没有不确定性的情况下，个人偏好的基本表示。这一发现的暗示是，要求纳什讨价还价的经验性工作可以（并且应该）使用比通常情况下更为通用和可靠的版本。

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