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Auction design for the private provision of public goods in developing countries: lessons from payments for environmental services in Malawi and Indonesia.

机译:发展中国家私人提供公共物品的拍卖设计:马拉维和印度尼西亚的环境服务付款中的教训。

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Payments for environmental services programs use direct incentives to improve the environmental impacts of private land use decisions. An auction offers an approach to efficiently allocating contracts among least-cost landholders, which can improve the overall cost-effectiveness of the approach. However, experiences with auctions in developing country settings are limited. We compare the results of two case studies that use auctions to allocate payments for environmental service contracts in Indonesia and Malawi. While the settings and the contracts differ, regularities in auction design allow comparisons and general lessons about the application of auctions to payments for environmental services programs.Digital Object Identifier http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2011.12.007
机译:环境服务计划的付款使用直接激励措施来改善私人土地使用决策的环境影响。拍卖提供了一种在最低成本的土地所有者之间有效分配合同的方法,可以提高该方法的总体成本效益。但是,发展中国家的拍卖经验有限。我们比较了两个案例研究的结果,这些案例使用拍卖来分配印度尼西亚和马拉维的环境服务合同付款。尽管设置和合同不同,但拍卖设计的规律性允许比较和拍卖有关将拍卖应用于环境服务计划付款的一般课程。Digital Object Identifier http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2011.12。 007

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