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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Applied Psychology >Personnel selection as a signaling game.
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Personnel selection as a signaling game.

机译：人员选择作为信号游戏。

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摘要

Personnel selection involves exchanges of information between job market actors (applicants and organizations). These actors do not have an incentive to exchange accurate information about their ability and commitment to the employment relationship unless it is to their advantage. This state of affairs explains numerous phenomena in personnel selection (e.g., faking). Signaling theory describes a mechanism by which parties with partly conflicting interests (and thus an incentive for deception) can nevertheless exchange accurate information. We apply signaling theory to personnel selection, distinguishing between adaptive relationships between applicants and organizations, among applicants, and among organizations. In each case, repeated adaptations and counteradaptations between actors can lead to situations of equilibrium or escalation (arms races). We show that viewing personnel selection as a network of adaptive relationships among job market actors enables an understanding of both classic and underexplored micro- and macro-level selection phenomena and their dynamic interactions.
机译：人员选拔涉及就业市场参与者（申请人和组织）之间的信息交换。这些参与者没有动力就他们的能力和对雇佣关系的承诺交换准确的信息，除非对他们有利。这种状况解释了人员选拔中的许多现象（例如伪造）。信令理论描述了一种机制，通过这种机制，部分利益冲突的各方（从而有诱骗动机）仍然可以交换准确的信息。我们将信号论应用于人员选择，以区分申请人与组织之间，申请人之间以及组织之间的适应性关系。在每种情况下，行为者之间的反复适应和反适应都可能导致平衡或升级（军备竞赛）的情况。我们表明，将人员选择视为工作市场参与者之间的适应性关系网络，可以理解经典的和未开发的微观和宏观选择现象及其动态相互作用。

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