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The value of discretion: Price-caps and public service delivery

机译：自行决定：价格 - 上限和公共服务交付

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摘要

It is often argued that price-caps on monopolistic suppliers are necessary to redistribute surplus and make services affordable. I explore whether price-caps lead to welfare improvements through a field experiment with extension agents in Tanzania. Imposing price-caps has three effects. First, conditional on being served, the treatment reduces average prices by 17%. Second, the intervention increases the share of previously unserved customers in the beneficiary pool by 15%. Third, the price-cap reduces the geographic coverage of services by decreasing the likelihood that agents will serve remote villages by 25%. This suggests that price-cap regulation creates a tension between making services affordable and providing incentives for agents to serve remote recipients. I show that the marginal welfare effect of reducing discretion over prices can be expressed as a function of two sufficient statistics. Calculating the welfare effects shows that any reduction of agents' discretion reduces social welfare.
机译：常常认为，在垄断供应商上的价格是重新分配盈余和使服务负担得起的必要条件。我探索价格上限是否通过坦桑尼亚的延伸代理商来实现福利改善。施加价格上限有三种影响。首先，在服务时，治疗减少了17％的平均价格。其次，干预将先前未维护的客户在受益池中的份额增加15％。第三，通过降低代理商将偏远村庄的可能性降低25％，降低服务的地理覆盖率。这表明，价格上限规定在制定服务经济实惠并为代理商提供服务偏远受助人提供激励之间的紧张关系。我表明，降低价格的边际福利效应可以表达为两个充足的统计数据。计算福利效果表明，任何减少代理人的自由裁量权减少社会福利。

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