• 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文期刊>Applied mathematics and computation >An acyclic relation for comparison of bargaining powers of coalitions and its interrelationship with bargaining set
【24h】

An acyclic relation for comparison of bargaining powers of coalitions and its interrelationship with bargaining set

机译：一个非循环关系，用于比较联盟的议价能力及其与议价集的相互关系

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

This paper proposes a method to compare bargaining power of coalitions within the framework of games in coalition form with transferable utility. The method is expressed by a relation on the set of all coalitions in a game, the relation which is defined based on the players' bargaining power. It is shown in this paper that the newly defined relation satisfies acyclicity. Also, it is verified in this paper that the set of all individually rational payoff configurations under which all coalitions have the equal bargaining power coincides with the bargaining set. Some examples demonstrate how the newly proposed method works.
机译：本文提出了一种在联盟形式的博弈框架内将联盟的议价能力与可转让效用进行比较的方法。该方法由游戏中所有联盟的集合上的关系表示，该关系是根据玩家的议价能力定义的。本文表明，新定义的关系满足非循环性。同样，本文证明了在所有联盟具有相等议价能力的情况下，所有单独的有理数收益配置的集合与议价集合重合。一些示例说明了新提出的方法如何工作。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号