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首页> 外文期刊>British Journal of Management >The Importance of Compensating Strategic Network Board Members for Network Performance: A Contingency Approach
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The Importance of Compensating Strategic Network Board Members for Network Performance: A Contingency Approach

机译：补偿战略网络董事会成员对网络绩效的重要性：一种应急方法

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摘要

Firms in government-supported strategic networks tend to rely on professional network board members for support and assistance. As such, two significant issues arise: should board members be compensated and under which circumstances is compensation more - or less - effective for network performance. Based on yearly panel data from 53 government-supported strategic networks of small- and medium-sized enterprises over a five-year period, this study examines the effects of compensating network board members. Advocating for a contingency approach, we combine the agency and stewardship literatures to posit that the effects of compensation are moderated by contingency factors that stimulate either an agency or stewardship relationship between the network board and the networking firms. Our findings indicate that significant funding, network firms represented on the network board, and top-down network formation stimulate board members to become agents rather than stewards. This therefore explains the higher effect of board member compensation under such conditions.
机译：政府支持的战略网络中的公司倾向于依靠专业的网络董事会成员提供支持和帮助。因此，出现了两个重要问题：应向董事会成员提供报酬，以及在何种情况下，报酬对网络性能的影响或多或少有效。根据五年中来自53个政府支持的中小企业战略网络的年度面板数据，本研究考察了补偿网络董事会成员的影响。提倡采取应急措施，我们结合了代理机构和管理方面的文献，得出结论认为，补偿的影响是由偶然性因素来调节的，这些因素刺激了网络董事会与网络公司之间的代理或管理关系。我们的发现表明，大量的资金，网络董事会中代表的网络公司以及自上而下的网络形成会刺激董事会成员成为代理商而不是管理者。因此，这解释了在这种情况下董事会成员补偿的更高效果。

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