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首页> 外文期刊>International Journal of Technology Management: The Journal of the Technology Management of Technology, Engineering Management, Technology Policy and Strategy >Innovative contractual structures for interorganizational systems
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Innovative contractual structures for interorganizational systems

机译：组织间系统的创新合同结构

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This paper tests the principal-agent theory in the context of contracting practices for the development of large-scale engineering projects. Five hypotheses are derived from the principal-agent theory regarding the propensity to use behaviour-based contracts versus outcome-based contracts function of the project owner's risk aversion and monitoring competencies, of the goal congruence between principal and agent, of the agent's risk aversion, and of the technological innovation required by the project. A sixth hypothesis states that more successful projects are more in line with the predictions of the first five hypotheses. All hypotheses are translated into testable propositions specific to large-scale engineering projects. For instance, outcome-based contracts are assimilated to fixed-price contracts such as turnkey and EPC. Results based on a sample of 60 power plant projects confirm that participants tend to select contracts as the principal agent theory predicts. Moreover, contracts used in successful projects follow more accurately the theoretical predictions. [References: 18]
机译：本文在大型工程项目开发的合同实践中测试了委托代理理论。从委托人理论得出五个假设，即使用基于行为的合同的倾向与基于结果的合同的倾向，这取决于项目所有者的风险规避和监控能力，委托人与代理人之间的目标一致性，代理人的风险规避，以及项目所需的技术创新。第六个假设指出，更成功的项目更符合前五个假设的预测。所有的假设都被转化为针对大型工程项目的可检验命题。例如，将基于结果的合同与固定价格合同（如交钥匙工程和EPC）同化。根据60个电厂项目的样本得出的结果证实，参与者倾向于按照委托人理论的预测选择合同。此外，成功项目中使用的合同会更准确地遵循理论预测。 [参考：18]

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