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Executive Turnover and Outside Directors on Two-Tiered Boards

机译:两层董事会的执行人员流失和外部董事

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摘要

This paper examines the determinants of executive turnover on two-tiered boards, emphasizing the monitoring role of supervisory board members with simultaneous outside directorships. Based on a unique sample of executives from large German firms, we find that outside supervisory board members generally increase executive turnover at the firms they monitor. This influence is especially pronounced when outside supervisory board members are simultaneously active as managers themselves and capital control is rather weak. These results suggest that external managers on supervisory boards enhance the monitoring intensity and substitute for weak capital control in the absence of large shareholders.
机译:本文研究了两层董事会中高管人员离职的决定因素,强调了同时担任外部董事职务的监事会成员的监督作用。根据来自德国大型公司的高管人员的独特样本,我们发现外部监事会成员通常会增加他们所监控的公司的高管人员流动。当外部监事会成员同时作为管理者本人活跃并且资本控制相当薄弱时,这种影响尤其明显。这些结果表明,在没有大股东的情况下,监事会的外部管理人员可以提高监督力度,并替代弱小的资本控制。

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