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Performance Pay, Union Bargaining and Within-Firm Wage Inequality

机译:绩效薪酬,工会谈判和企业内部工资不平等

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Theory predicts that performance pay boosts wage dispersion. Workers retain a share of individual productivity shocks and high-efficiency workers receive compensation for greater effort. Collective bargaining can mitigate the effect of performance pay on wage inequality by easing monitoring of common effort standards and group-based pay schemes. Analyses of longitudinal employer-employee data show that the introduction of performance-related pay raises wage inequality in non-union firms, but not in firms with high union density. Although performance-related pay appears to be on the rise, the overall impact on wage dispersion is likely to be small, particularly in European countries with influential unions.
机译:理论预测,绩效工资会促进工资分散。工人在个人生产力冲击中所占的比例很高,而高效率的工人则因付出更大的努力而获得报酬。集体谈判可以通过简化对共同努力标准和基于群体的薪酬计划的监控,来减轻绩效工资对工资不平等的影响。纵向雇主-雇员数据的分析表明,与绩效挂钩的工资的引入加剧了非工会企业的工资不平等,但工会密度高的企业却没有。尽管与绩效相关的工资似乎正在上升,但对工资分散的总体影响可能很小,尤其是在工会影响较大的欧洲国家。

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