摘要：
Since the rise of financial globalization and American"shareholder capitalism"in the 1980s,the shareholder-oriented corporate governance model has become more and more prevalent around the world.It was widely perceived as the"best"corporate governance model or"international best practices", which has not only impacted the stakeholder-oriented corporate governance model of Germany and Japan,but also shaped corporate governance reform of developing countries and transitional countries like China.The author argues that the adoption of shareholder-oriented corporate governance institutions in China was mainly driven by two endogenous and exogenous factors,and diffused through three mechanisms in two phases. In the first phase, at the transnational level(from America to China), mimetic isomorphism and normative isomorphism are at play.In the second stage,at the domestic firm-level,the government requires companies to adopt new corporate governance institutions through laws,regulations and policies,that is,the mechanism of"coercive isomorphism"has played a leading role.This paper contributes to organizational theory and economic sociology theory by extending the basic postulates of the new institutionalism to the study of international diffusion and isomorphism of organizational practices.While the importance of imitation among network members in the diffusion of organizational practices has often been shown at the interpersonal and inter-organizational(firm)levels,this research offers support for a similar mechanism operating at the international level.Taken together,the findings demonstrate the importance of power(vs. efficiency)in the adoption of organizational practices in general,and the role of the state(vs.financial market)in the international diffusion of American corporate governance practices in particular.Furthermore,the sociological analysis of China's corporate governance reform in this paper is helpful for us to deepen our understanding of China's financial market and listed companies, providing a new perspective different from that given by Economics and Management Science.The analysis has important theoretical and practical significance in reflecting the Western neo-liberal enterprise model and constructing a"modern enterprise system"with Chinese characteristics.%自20世纪80年代以来,由于金融全球化和美式"股东资本主义"的兴起,"股东导向型"公司治理制度在全世界的影响越来越大,被誉为最佳公司治理模式或"国际惯例".它不但影响了德、日等发达国家,也影响了中国等发展中国家和转型国家的公司治理改革.本文认为,"股东导向型"公司治理制度在中国的传播主要由内生性和外生性两大动机驱动,经过两个阶段和通过三种机制完成.第一阶段是在跨国层面,"模仿性同构"机制和"规范性同构"机制发挥了重要作用;第二阶段是在国内企业层面,政府通过法律法规和政策等手段要求企业采用新的公司治理模式,即"强制性同构"机制发挥了主导作用.对中国公司治理改革的社会学分析有助于我们从一个不同于经济学和管理学的新视角加深对中国金融市场和上市公司的理解,对于反思西方新自由主义企业制度,构建具有中国特色的现代企业制度具有较为重要的理论和现实意义.
