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The game analysis and countermeasures study of rent-seeking behavior of engineering supervisor

机译:工程监督员租赁行为的游戏分析及对策研究

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The rent-seeking action of engineering supervisor is a problem which the construction management departments at all levels always attach great importance to. With the further analysis of the relationship among contractor, engineering supervisor and owner in this paper, rent-seeking theory is employed to investigate the motive of the rent-seeking between engineering supervisor and contractor. Based on the principalagent theory, this paper establishes a three party game model of contractor, engineering supervisor and employer, analyses the model and the game result in detail and puts forward measures to reduce the rent-seeking action of engineering supervisor.
机译:寻求租赁的工程主管行动是各级建筑管理部门的问题总是非常重视。随着承包商,工程监督员和所有者之间的关系进一步分析本文,采用寻租理论来调查工程监督员和承包商之间寻求租金的动机。本文基于原则性理论,建立了承包商,工程主管和雇主的三方游戏模式,分析了模型和游戏的细节结果,并提出了减少工程监督员租赁行动的措施。

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