• 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文学位 >Essays in political economy and industrial organization.
【24h】

Essays in political economy and industrial organization.

机译：政治经济学和产业组织方面的论文。

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

The first essay provides a multiperiod model of political competition in which voters imperfectly observe the electoral promises made to other voters. Imperfect observability generates an incentive for candidates to offer excessive transfers even if voters are homogeneous and taxation is distortionary. Government spending is larger than in a world of perfect observability. Transfers are partly financed through government debt, and the size of the debt is higher in less transparent political systems. The model provides an explanation of fiscal churning, and of the choice of inefficient tools of redistribution. An implication of the model is that increasing the transparency of the political system does not unambiguously improve efficiency: transparency of transfers is beneficial but transparency of revenues can be counterproductive.; The second essay develops a dynamic model of transactions in used capital to illustrate the role of lessors as intermediaries that enhance the efficiency with which aircraft are redeployed across carriers. Carriers trade aircraft either to replace their fleet or to reduce excess capacity. Trading frictions hinder the efficiency of the allocation of capital and lessors reduce frictions by centralizing the exchange. Thus, leased aircraft trade more frequently and produce a higher output than owned aircraft, as lower barriers to trade imply that lessees are more productive than owners and allow a finer pairing between quality of capital and productivity of carriers on leased aircraft. In the empirical section, consistent with the model, we find that (1) leased aircraft have a holding duration 40% shorter than owned aircraft; (2) leased aircraft have 8% higher output than owned aircraft. The estimates imply that most of the gain in output arises because lower barriers to trade increase the average productivity of carriers, and finer pairing contributes only to 0.14% of the gain. The estimates also imply that the gain from perfect pairing between quality and productivity would raise current output only by 0.56%.; Finally, the third essay studies patterns in the prices of aircraft over time and the relationship between volume of trade and depreciation of aircraft.
机译：第一篇文章提供了一种政治竞争的多周期模型，其中选民不完全遵守对其他选民的选举承诺。可观察性的不完善会诱使候选人提供过多的转移，即使选民是同质的，税收也是扭曲的。政府支出比可观察性强的世界要大。转移资金的一部分是通过政府债务筹集的，在透明度较低的政治体系中，债务规模更大。该模型提供了有关财政变动的说明，以及对效率低下的再分配工具的选择。该模型的含义是，增加政治系统的透明度并不能明确地提高效率：转移的透明度是有益的，但收入的透明度可能适得其反。第二篇文章建立了一个动态的二手资本交易模型，以说明出租人作为中介的作用，从而提高了跨承运人重新部署飞机的效率。运营商交易飞机以替换其机队或减少过剩容量。贸易摩擦阻碍了资本分配的效率，出租人通过集中交易来减少摩擦。因此，租赁飞机的交易比自有飞机更频繁，产生的产出也更高，因为较低的贸易壁垒意味着承租人比所有者拥有更高的生产率，并且可以使租赁飞机的承运人的资本质量与生产率之间更好地配对。在与模型相符的经验部分，我们发现（1）租赁飞机的持有期比自有飞机的持有期短40％； （2）租赁飞机的产量比自有飞机高8％。估计表明，产出的大部分增长是由于较低的贸易壁垒提高了承运人的平均生产率，而更精细的配对仅占增长的0.14％。估计还暗示，从质量和生产率之间完美配对所获得的收益只会使电流输出提高0.56％。最后，第三篇论文研究了飞机价格随时间变化的模式以及贸易量与飞机折旧之间的关系。

著录项

  • 作者

    Gavazza, Alessandro.;

  • 作者单位

    New York University.;

  • 授予单位 New York University.;
  • 学科 Economics General.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2005
  • 页码 175 p.
  • 总页数 175
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 经济学;
  • 关键词

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号