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Essays in political economy and industrial organization.

机译：政治经济学和产业组织方面的论文。

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摘要

This dissertation consists of three chapters. The first two discuss sequential elections and the last one discusses the effects of merchant surcharging on credit card users.;In the first chapter (co-authored with Vinayak Tripathi), we examine an electoral framework in which agents can strategically choose when to vote and can observe the votes of those who precede them. This is in contrast to the literature on Condorcet's Jury Theorem which has limited its attention to simultaneous and sequential voting games. We show that in a common value setting, such an election aggregates information efficiently regardless of the voting rule or the size of the electorate. The proposed election format ensures that the Jury Theorem obtains for an electorate with differentially informed agents. Under more restrictive conditions, this framework can also produce the efficient outcome in environments where voters have conflicting interests or the size of the electorate is uncertain. Finally, we examine the performance of the election when private signals are multidimensional.;In the second chapter, we compare Nash Equilibria of private-value elections under simultaneous and sequential voting, where voters know their ideal candidate, but do not know how many other voters share their preferences. For the case of two candidates, we show that the sequential election can prevent dominated equilibria present in the simultaneous election under certain conditions. Next, we extend our results to the case of three candidates. Finally, we provide a setting with a sequential election with three candidates in which later voters observe early votes to determine which vote is more likely to be pivotal, illustrating that the sequential election can convey information in a way that is impossible in a simultaneous election.;In the third chapter, we study the positive effect of the no-surcharge rule in restraining upstream and downstream market power (double marginalization). We study settings where credit card firms compete and thus have limited upstream market power as well as monopolist credit cards. Comparing consumer welfare under a merchant surcharging and a no-merchant surcharging rule, we find that a monopolist merchant that can surcharge charges excessively, resulting in too little card use. A no-surcharge rule can act as an effective deterrent and can never make consumers worse off in any of the cases we study.
机译：本文共分三章。前两个讨论顺序选举，最后一个讨论商人收取费用对信用卡用户的影响。在第一章（与Vinayak Tripathi合着）中，我们研究了选举框架，代理商可以在其中选择策略地选择何时投票和投票。可以观察到他们之前的选民的投票。这与Condorcet的陪审团定理的文献形成对比，该文献将注意力集中在同时进行和顺序进行的投票游戏中。我们证明，在通用值设置中，这样的选举有效地聚合了信息，而与投票规则或选民人数无关。拟议的选举形式可确保陪审团定理获得具有不同知情代理的选民。在更严格的条件下，该框架还可以在选民利益冲突或选民人数不确定的环境中产生有效的结果。最后，我们研究了当私人信号是多维的情况下选举的表现。在第二章中，我们比较了同时进行和顺序表决下私人价值选举的纳什均衡，在这种情况下，选民知道他们的理想候选人，但不知道有多少其他候选人选民们分享他们的偏好。对于两名候选人的情况，我们证明了在某些条件下，连续选举可以防止同时选举中存在的主导均衡。接下来，我们将结果扩展到三个候选者的情况。最后，我们提供了一个由三名候选人组成的连续选举的设置，在此情况下，后来的选民会观察早期选票，以确定哪个投票更有可能成为关键选举，这说明连续选举可以通过同步选举无法实现的方式传达信息。在第三章中，我们研究了无附加费用规则在抑制上游和下游市场力量（双重边缘化）方面的积极作用。我们研究了信用卡公司竞争的环境，从而限制了上游市场的力量以及垄断的信用卡。比较商户附加费和无商户附加费规则下的消费者福利，我们发现可以对附加费多收附加费的垄断商户，导致卡的使用量过少。在我们研究的任何情况下，不收取附加费的规则都可以起到有效的威慑作用，并且永远不会使消费者的生活变得更糟。

著录项

  • 作者

    Rokas, Konstantinos N.;

  • 作者单位

    Princeton University.;

  • 授予单位 Princeton University.;
  • 学科 Business Administration Management.;Economics Theory.;Political Science General.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2009
  • 页码 91 p.
  • 总页数 91
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 贸易经济;政治理论;经济学;
  • 关键词

  • 入库时间 2022-08-17 11:38:25

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