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Making a second price auction more attractive to a seller with risk-averse buyers: The buy-it-now option.

机译：使第二次价格拍卖对具有规避风险的买家的卖家更具吸引力：“立即购买”选项。

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摘要

This dissertation consists of two related chapters that study a well-observed feature on Internet auctions---the buy-it-now option. In such an option, the seller sets a buy-it-now price before the auction begins. A bidder can purchase the asset instantly at this price and there will be no follow-up auction. Alternatively, the bidder can bid for the asset, which ends the buy-it-now option and an auction ensues. The first chapter builds a theoretical model and shows that the buy-it-now option can make a seller strictly better off, thus rationalizing the wide adoption of this option in Internet auctions. This finding also sheds light on the selling mechanism design with the restriction of "losers do not pay" when buyers are risk averse. The second chapter provides empirical evidences from eBay that the buy-it-now option can make sellers strictly better off.; The first chapter introduces the buy-it-now option to a private value second price auction (SPA) with constant absolute risk averse buyers. This chapter analyzes the effect of the buy-it-now option from both the seller's and buyers' perspectives. By taking the buy-it-now option, the buyer removes two kinds of risks: (1) winning or losing, (2) random payment if winning, since he will acquire the item with certainty at the buy-it-now price set by the seller. A risk-averse buyer is willing to pay a premium to buy "insurance", which is the source of the increment in the seller's expected payoff. Compared with a standard SPA, the ex ante expected utility increases for the buyer who has the buy-it-now option, but decreases for other buyers.; The optimal auction design with risk-averse buyers requires payment transfers between a seller and losing bidders. This requirement is unattractive when such payment transfers are costly or infeasible. This chapter shows one way to improve the performance of auctions with the restriction "losers do not pay" is to use a buy-it-now option, which has been employed by Internet auction sites.; The second chapter provides empirical evidence on the effectiveness of the buy-it-now option. Data collected from eBay are examined with the censored normal maximum likelihood estimation procedure. Evidence shows a positive correlation between the sale price and the use of the buy-it-now option. Results from a probit estimation confirm that the execution of the buy-it-now option has a positive relationship with the buy-it-now price, but negative relationships with the number of listing days and the shipping & handling fee.
机译：本文由两个相关的章节组成，它们研究了互联网拍卖中一个广为人知的功能，即“立即购买”选项。在这种选择中，卖方在拍卖开始之前设定立即购买的价格。投标者可以此价格立即购买资产，并且不会进行后续拍卖。或者，竞标者可以竞标该资产，从而终止“立即购买”选项并随后进行拍卖。第一章建立了一个理论模型，并显示了“立即购买”选项可以使卖方的状况更为严格，从而合理化了此选项在互联网拍卖中的广泛采用。这一发现还通过限制买方避免风险时的“失败者不付款”的销售机制设计提供了启示。第二章提供了来自eBay的经验证据，即买即买的选择可以使卖方的状况更为严格。第一章将“立即购买”选项介绍给具有不变的绝对风险厌恶购买者的私有价值第二价格拍卖（SPA）。本章从买卖双方的角度分析了立即购买选项的效果。通过采用“立即购买”选项，买方消除了两种风险：（1）获胜或失败；（2）获胜时随机付款，因为他将以“立即购买”的价格确定地购买物品。由卖方。规避风险的买方愿意为购买“保险”支付溢价，这是卖方预期收益增加的来源。与标准SPA相比，具有立即购买选项的购买者的事前预期效用增加，而其他购买者的事前预期效用则降低。具有规避风险的买家的最佳拍卖设计要求在卖家和失败的竞标者之间进行付款转移。当此类付款转账成本高昂或不可行时，此要求就没有吸引力。本章说明了一种通过限制“失败者不支付”来提高拍卖业绩的方法，即使用Internet拍卖网站已采用的立即购买选项。第二章提供了“立即购买”选择的有效性的经验证据。从eBay收集的数据将通过审查的正常最大似然估计程序进行检查。证据表明，销售价格与立即购买选项的使用之间存在正相关。概率估算的结果证实，“立即购买”选项的执行与“立即购买”价格具有正相关关系，而与上市天数以及运输和手续费具有负相关关系。

著录项

  • 作者

    Jiang, Bo.;

  • 作者单位

    Duke University.;

  • 授予单位 Duke University.;
  • 学科 Economics Theory.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2005
  • 页码 62 p.
  • 总页数 62
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 经济学;
  • 关键词

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