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首页> 外文期刊>The Review of Economic Studies >Buying Shares and/or Votes for Corporate Control
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Buying Shares and/or Votes for Corporate Control

机译：购买股份和/或投票以进行公司控制

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We explore how allowing votes to be traded separately of shares may affect the efficiency of corporate control contests. Our basic set-up and the nature of the questions continue the work of Grossman and Hart (1980), Harris and Raviv (1988), and Blair, Golbe and Gerard (1989). We consider three cases with respect to the allowable price offers (for shares and for votes when they can be traded separately): unrestricted price offers, quantity-restricted price offers, and price offers contingent on winning. Our main results are characterizations of the equilibria and of the circumstances under which vote buying is harmful. We show that allowing votes to be traded separately of shares results in inefficiencies in all the cases we study. Similarly allowing quantity-restricted offers is also harmful, but allowing conditional offers is not in itself detrimental to efficiency. The paper also makes a methodological contribution to the analysis of takeover games with atomless shareholders. It provides a way of dealing with asymmetric equilibria that must be dealt with for a complete analysis and it proves existence of an equilibrium.
机译：我们探讨了允许票数与股票分开交易如何影响公司控制权竞赛的效率。我们的基本设置和问题的性质继续了Grossman和Hart（1980），Harris和Raviv（1988）以及Blair，Golbe和Gerard（1989）的工作。关于允许的价格要约（对于股票和可以单独交易的票，我们考虑三种情况）：非限制价格要约，数量限制价格要约和取决于获胜的价格要约。我们的主要结果是对均衡和购票有害的情况进行描述。我们证明，在我们研究的所有情况下，允许票数与股票分开交易都会导致效率低下。同样，允许数量限制的报价也很有害，但允许有条件的报价本身并不损害效率。本文还为分析无原子股东的收购博弈提供了方法论上的贡献。它提供了一种处理不对称平衡的方法，必须进行全面分析才能证明这一点，并且证明了平衡的存在。

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