...
  • 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文期刊>Management science: Journal of the Institute of Management Sciences >An Experimental Study of Buyer-seller Negotiation with One-sided Incomplete Information and Time Discounting
【24h】

An Experimental Study of Buyer-seller Negotiation with One-sided Incomplete Information and Time Discounting

机译：单侧信息不完整和时间折扣的买卖双方谈判的实验研究

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
   

获取外文期刊封面封底 >>

       
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

We study a multiperiod bargaining mechanism in which a seller negotiates with a buyer over the price of an indivisible good. It is common knowledge that the good has zero value to the seller. Its value to the buyer is privately known, distributed independently of the seller's value according to a distribution that is common knowledge. Bargaining proceeds as follows. The seller sets a price and offers the buyer an opportunity to purchase the good. The buyer either waits for at least one more period or agrees to purchase the good at the given price. If the buyer refuses the offer, then the process is repeated with the seller making a new offer on the next period. Our findings reveal several behavioral regularities, which do not support the sequential equilibrium for this bargaining mechanism. In line with recent developments in behavioral decision theory and game theory, which assume bounded rationality, we find that subjects follow simple rules of thumb in choosing strategies, reflected in the behavioral consistencies observed in this study.
机译：我们研究了一种多期议价机制，其中卖方与买方就不可分割商品的价格进行谈判。众所周知，商品对卖方的价值为零。它对买方的价值是众所周知的，根据公知的分配独立于卖方的价值进行分配。讨价还价的过程如下。卖方设定价格，并为买方提供购买商品的机会。买方要么至少等待一个以上的期限，要么同意以给定的价格购买商品。如果买方拒绝了要约，则重复该过程，卖方在下一个期间提出新要约。我们的发现揭示了一些行为规律，这些规律不支持这种讨价还价机制的顺序均衡。与行为决策理论和博弈论的最新发展相吻合，后者假设有限理性，我们发现受试者在选择策略时遵循简单的经验法则，这反映在本研究中观察到的行为一致性上。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号