Layoffs with Payoffs: A Bargaining Model of Union Wage and Severance Pay Determination

AI ISON L. BOOTH

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Layoffs with Payoffs: A Bargaining Model of Union Wage and Severance Pay Determination

机译：用薪水裁员：工会工资和遣散费确定的讨价还价模型

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Popular characlcnzations of tiade union preferences assume that the income of laid-off union mcmbers is exogenous. Given the widespread existence of (partial) ultra-union distribution schemes including severance pay, this paper provides a model of union firm bargaining in which workers' layoff income is endogenously determined. Where unions and firms bargain over wages and severance pay, workers' incomes arc invariant to their employment status, and the wage corresponding to the level of ex post employment is equal to the opportunity cost of labour. The equality of maiginal productivity to the opportunity cost of labour (which is a nrccssary and suflicient condition for the bargaining surplus to be maximized) charac-lerizes c-mpluyrni.nl in boll) the right-to-managc and the efficient bargaining union models, and has, implication for empirical research trying to distinguish between these two approaches The bai gaining mo el developed in this paper can also be compared with the outcome of the implicit contract n nicl with redundancy pay; but a crucial point of difference is that the result in this paper lenves from a unionised labour market where unions and firms bargain over wages and ret mdancy pay while the implicit contract result derives from a perfectly competitive labour maikct in winch competitive forces lead to an elficient outcome.

机译：工会联盟偏好的普遍特征是假设下岗工会成员的收入是外生的。考虑到包括解雇费在内的（部分）超工会分配计划的广泛存在，本文提供了工会公司讨价还价的模型，其中工人的解雇收入是内生的。在工会和公司就工资和遣散费进行讨价还价的情况下，工人的收入与他们的就业状况无关，并且与事后就业水平相对应的工资等于劳动力的机会成本。原始生产率与劳动机会成本的相等性（这是使讨价还价的最大化最大化的必要条件），使c-mpluyrni.nl变得无所适从。并试图对这两种方法进行区分，这对实证研究具有意义。本文开发的“白收益模型”也可以与具有冗余薪酬的隐式合同的结果进行比较。但是关键的不同点在于，本文的结果来自工会化的劳动力市场，工会和企业就工资和剩余工资进行讨价还价，而隐性合同的结果则来自绞车竞争中完全竞争性的劳动力市场，从而导致了结果。

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《Economica》 |1995年第248期|共14页
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AI ISON L. BOOTH;
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专利

1. Layoffs with Payoffs: A Bargaining Model of Union Wage and Severance Pay Determination [J] . AI ISON L. BOOTH Economica . 1995,第248期

机译：用薪水裁员：工会工资和遣散费确定的讨价还价模型
2. Understanding the Determination of Severance Pay: Mandates, Bargaining, and Unions* [J] . The Scandinavian Journal of Economics . 2020,第3期

机译：了解遣散费的确定：任务，讨价还价和工会*
3. Performance Pay, Union Bargaining and Within-Firm Wage Inequality [J] . Erling Barth, Bernt Bratsberg, Torbjorn Haegeland Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics . 2012,第3期

机译：绩效薪酬，工会谈判和企业内部工资不平等
4. Who Wins on Wage Decision:An Empirical Study of the Effects of Bargaining Power on Wages in China [C] . SONG Zhan, MU Junlin International Institute of Statistics Management Engineering Symposium . 2012

机译：谁在工资决定上获胜：议价能力对中国工资影响的实证研究
5. Alternative models of the determination of the union status of women wage-laborers. [D] . Griffin-Graves, Janet Ruth. 1990

机译：确定女工工资工会地位的替代模型。
6. Impact of Third-Party Payors on Collective Bargaining in the Health Industry [O] . Bruce Steinwald 1983

机译：第三方付款人对医疗行业集体谈判的影响
7. We analyze, in this paper, a DSGE New Keynesian model with indi- visible labor where firms may belong to two different final goods producing sectors one where wages and employment are determined in competitive labor markets and the orther where wages and employment are the result of a contractual process between unions and firms. Bargaining between firms and monopoly unions implies real wage rigidity in the model and, in turn, an endogenous trade-off between output stabilization and infla- tion stabilization. We show that the negative effect of a productivity shock on inflation and the positive effect of a cost-push shock is crucially determined by the proportion of firms that belong to the competitive sec- tor. The larger is this number, the smaller are these effects. We derive a welfare based objective function as a second order Taylor approxima- tion of the expected utility of the economy's representative agent and we analyze optimal monetary policy. We show that the larger is the num- ber of firms that belong to the competitive sector, the smaller should be the response of the nominal interest rate to exogenous productivity and cost-push shocks. If we consider, however, an instrument rule where the interest rate must react to inflationary expectations, the rule is not af- fected by the structure of the labor market. The results of the model are consistent with a well known empirical regularity in macroeconomics, i.e. that employment volatility is larger than real wage volatility. [O] . Lorenza Rossi, Fabrizio Mattesini 100

机译：在本文中，我们分析了DsGE新凯恩斯主义模型，该模型具有明显的劳动力，其中企业可能属于两个不同的最终产品生产部门，其中工资和就业是在竞争性劳动力市场中确定的，而工资和就业是由工资和就业导致的。工会和公司之间的合同过程。企业和垄断联盟之间的讨价还价意味着模型中的实际工资刚性，反过来，产出稳定和通货膨胀稳定之间的内生权衡。我们表明，生产率冲击对通货膨胀的负面影响以及成本推动冲击的积极影响，主要取决于属于竞争部门的企业比例。这个数字越大，这些效果越小。我们得出一个基于福利的目标函数作为经济代理人的预期效用的二阶泰勒近似，我们分析最优货币政策。我们表明，属于竞争性行业的企业数量越大，名义利率对外生生产率和成本推动冲击的反应就越小。但是，如果我们考虑利率必须对通胀预期作出反应的工具规则，则该规则不受劳动力市场结构的影响。该模型的结果与宏观经济学中众所周知的经验规律一致，即就业波动率大于实际工资波动率。

Layoffs with Payoffs: A Bargaining Model of Union Wage and Severance Pay Determination

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